



Towards Greater Effectiveness and Timeliness  
in Humanitarian Emergency Response



# BUILDING RESILIENCE

## THE STATE OF LOCALISATION IN PAKISTAN

## **AUTHORS**

### **Qadeer Baig**

This research was conducted by Qadeer Baig with assistance of Aftab Ahmed Awan and Sundus Wajahat (NGORC). The literature review and localisation frameworks were provided by the Global Mentoring Initiative (GMI).

Qadeer Baig is the CEO and Principal Consultant of the NGO Resource Centre (NGORC) in Karachi. For this research he was assisted by NGORC associates Aftab Ahmed Awan and Sundus Wajahat. NGORC works for the strengthening of the NGO Sector in Pakistan through innovative combination of research, training, networking and knowledge management.

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## **DISCLAIMER**

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# **BUILDING RESILIENCE**

## **THE STATE OF LOCALISATION IN PAKISTAN**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research was commissioned by the ToGETHER Consortium of four German humanitarian NGOs (Caritas Germany, Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe and Malteser International). It is part of a series of eight country studies and one comparative analysis with other reports for Bangladesh, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Myanmar and Somalia. The analysis aims at informing the programme's efforts to advance localisation in these countries. Furthermore, it contributes to a wider translation into practice of the commitments that international agencies have made to support and reinforce rather than replace national and local crisis responders in their countries.

The report first explores the context, with particular attention to the role of the federal government and the legal-political space for civil society. It then maps what could be identified as important localisation-relevant initiatives and localisation conversations. Subsequently, more details are provided on the four dimensions of localisation which were investigated in particular – quality of relationship, finances, capacities, and coordination. Additionally, the cross-cutting issue of gender and localisation is discussed.

### ***A disaster-prone country***

Pakistan is a disaster-prone country and vulnerable to various natural and human-made hazards. The country is primarily affected by earthquakes, floods, hill torrents, monsoons and cyclones and geopolitical crises in the border areas of the country. These disasters have had devastating consequences on socioeconomic systems and human development. The recent COVID-19 crisis has posed new challenges for the people, the health system and the economy of Pakistan. It is causing a significant reversal of development gains.

### ***Successful establishment of governmental disaster management structures***

Before 2005, Pakistan did not have a formal structure for disaster management. After the earthquake in 2005, the Government of Pakistan established the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) to lead the rebuilding operations. The National Disaster Management (NDM) Ordinance was promulgated in December 2006 and became the NDM Act in 2010. Under this act, a three-tier disaster management regime has been adopted. In this three-tier system, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is the focal point at federal level, the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) are the focal point for DRM endeavours in the various provinces and the State Disaster Management Authority in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMA) on the district levels. This system is working hard to mitigate DRR challenges.

Over the years, the national capacity to respond to disasters and emergencies has improved considerably and Pakistan has come a long way since the 2005 earthquake. The National Disaster Management Authority, Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs) are now quite well trained and adequately resourced to respond to different emergencies. Both can now manage small to medium scale emergencies on their own without international support.

### ***Disaster Preparedness Platform connects government, private sector and other stakeholders***

In Pakistan, civil society, the private sector, government and international development partners have all contributed significantly towards disaster response. Large enterprises from the private sector also contributed to disaster response and recoveries by providing expertise,



skills and other resources. To ensure investment by the private sector in disaster risk reduction/preparedness processes, the private sector was included in the Pakistan Preparedness Partnership (PRP), a platform to increase interface between government, private sector and other stakeholders.

### ***National Humanitarian Network (NHN) is the core platform for Pakistani CSO localisation engagement***

In 2008, many Pakistani CSOs started forming alliances and networks. The National Humanitarian Network (NHN) is the core platform for Pakistani CSOs' engagement around the localisation agenda. Its focus areas are advocacy, coordination, policy and procedural arrangements, capacity building and knowledge management. A core objective of the NHN, currently counting 172 members, has been to engage with DRR stakeholders throughout Pakistan for the promotion of humanitarian values by influencing policies and building capacities to ensure a rights-based humanitarian response. NHN also advocates for the allocation of greater resources for local organisations in different platforms.

### ***Strong localisation collaboration between the NHN and Start Network***

The Start Network and the National Humanitarian Network have been two important actors towards the objective of strong Pakistani capabilities to deal with all types of crises generating humanitarian needs, with international agencies more in a supporting and reinforcing role. In September 2017, the NHN and the Start Network entered into close collaboration. A Realization Committee was formed to pursue the vision of strong Pakistani leadership. The committee came up with a business case that was approved by the Start Global Assembly and Board. In that context, the Start Network, via ACTED, supported the NHN with the coordination of the response for the Mirpur earthquake. Pakistan is also one of the five countries where the Shifting the Power (StP) project has been implemented. StP aimed to strengthen the capacity and influence of local and national humanitarian actors, and to contribute to the development of a more balanced humanitarian system.

### ***Significant involvement of CSOs and NGOs in disaster response***

About 49.35 % of CSOs and NGOs, which were contacted through the survey conducted for this research, reported that they were involved in some kind of emergency response in the last five years. Most of these CSOs/NGOs reported engagement with both development and advocacy. The development efforts often help communities in responding to the disasters quickly and effectively.

### ***INGOs and other donors are not the main source of NGO/CSO funding***

Though INGOs and other donors provide significant support during emergencies and disasters, they are not the major source of funding for disaster and emergency response. The majority of the organizations, i.e. 44.5%, reported that they also receive significant support through local philanthropy. The COVID-19 response, for example, is largely financed through local philanthropy and donations.

44.16% of NGOs reported that they receive donations from individuals, 46.47% reported that they get membership fees as well. Most of the time, however, the membership fees are very insignificant, and these NGOs remain dependent on different sources of international funding. At the same time, international for-profit consulting and contractor firms, which hold the major part of the large-scale funding from donors like FCDO, USAID and EU, are seen as a contributing factor to the declining access to funding for CSOs.

Furthermore, while various funds for disaster management exist, access for NGOs/CSOs



varies. The government-run National Disaster Risk Management Fund, for example, provides matching grants up to 70%. However, a considerable number of NGOs/CSOs find it difficult to raise the complementary 30%. In comparison, it is much easier for local actors to receive funds from the Pakistan Humanitarian Fund, managed by OCHA.

### ***Notable examples of good practice in capacity building exist***

While the positive impact of training workshops as a preferred means of providing capacity building is limited in Pakistan just as in other countries, some examples of good practice have been identified. A four-year programme run by the Consortium for Natural Disaster Preparedness, Response and Recovery in Pakistan is one such relevant initiative. The same is true for the Start Network's Shifting the Power project, in which 12 Pakistani CSOs participated. More than 60% of the CSO respondents to the survey conducted for this research reported that they had been involved in a capacity building effort in the past. The training focus varied, however, and only 35% had received training for emergency response.

### ***Decreasing space for civil society***

Over the years, the space for the civil society has decreased in Pakistan. Due to the cumbersome and complex procedure of registration and the requirement of layered documents, the situation has become a struggle for survival for many local NGOs/CSOs. Most of the NGOs are struggling with the new regulations introduced by the Government of Pakistan. This situation is not the only factor making survival challenging for NGOs, as a good number of NGOs in Pakistan are dependent on support from international partners that have reduced response for the NGOs in case of any disaster or emergency. The research shows that a large number of CSOs in Pakistan are small in size, in terms of budget and numbers of staff, and do not have sufficient resources to survive for long in the absence of external funding support.

### ***Localisation process is still in an early phase and has lost momentum***

The process of a collective and intentional 'localisation' in Pakistan, as a strategic objective to support the further development of strong collective governmental and non-governmental capacities to manage various types of crises, is still in an early phase. There is not yet a common understanding, in line with the purpose and intent of the Grand Bargain, and no clear strategic framework to direct various efforts towards a collective outcome. Worryingly, the research shows that the process has lost momentum, and that, at least for various Pakistani CSOs, the prospects are very challenging.

This is the combined effect of a number of factors and trends that have different sources but aggravate the effect. The most important are (i) heightened security concerns which resulted in complex and time-consuming re-registration processes, and more time-consuming approvals required for programmes and projects, at least in some sensitive areas of the country (this also affected several INGOs), (ii) donor trends to pass large financing envelopes through for-profit contractors or government funds, or (iii) to offer excessively designed projects, mostly including only project costs in the budget, with the effect of putting the CSO in a sub-contractor position.





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## ACRONYMS

<b>ADRRN</b>	Asian Disaster Reduction and response Network
<b>AJK</b>	State Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority
<b>BDN</b>	Balochistan Development Network
<b>CBDRM</b>	Community Based Disaster Risk Management
<b>CBO</b>	Community Based Organization
<b>CBPF</b>	Country Based Pool Fund
<b>CHS</b>	Common Humanitarian Standards
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organization
<b>CSR</b>	Corporate Social Responsibility
<b>CWS</b>	Church World Service
<b>CWSA</b>	Community World Service Asia
<b>DDMA</b>	District Disasters Management Authorities
<b>DEPP</b>	Disasters and Emergencies Preparedness Programme
<b>DRR</b>	Disaster Risk Reduction
<b>DPM</b>	Development Planning and Management
<b>EAD</b>	Economic Affairs Division
<b>ERRA</b>	Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority
<b>ERT</b>	Emergency Response Teams
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>FCDO</b>	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, UK
<b>FGD</b>	Focus Group Discussion
<b>FPCCI</b>	Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industries
<b>FRC</b>	Federal Relief Commission
<b>GBV</b>	Gender Based Violence
<b>GLOF</b>	Glacier Lake Outburst Flooding
<b>GMI</b>	Global Mentoring Initiative
<b>GNDR</b>	Global Network of Civil Society Organizations for Disaster Reduction
<b>GTF</b>	Gender Task Force
<b>HAT</b>	Humanitarian Assistance Team
<b>HCT</b>	Humanitarian Country Team
<b>HRDN</b>	Human Resource Development Network
<b>IASC</b>	Interagency Standing Committee
<b>ICT</b>	Information Communication Technology
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>INGO</b>	International Non-Governmental Organization



<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>KII</b>	Key Informant Interviews
<b>KP</b>	Provincial Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority
<b>MoI</b>	Ministry of Interior
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>NAERO</b>	Northern Areas Earthquake Relief Operation
<b>NDC</b>	Natural Disasters Consortium
<b>NDMA</b>	Natural Disaster Management Authority
<b>NDMC</b>	Natural Disaster Management Commission
<b>NDMP</b>	Natural Disaster Management Plan
<b>NDRMF</b>	Natural Disaster Risk Management Fund
<b>NED</b>	National Endowment for Democracy
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>NGORC</b>	NGO Resource Centre
<b>NHN</b>	National Humanitarian Network
<b>NRSP</b>	National Rural Support Program
<b>PCP</b>	Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy
<b>PDMA</b>	Provincial Disaster Management Authority
<b>PHF</b>	Pakistan Humanitarian Forum
<b>PHPF</b>	Pakistan Humanitarian Pooled Fund
<b>PPAF</b>	Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund
<b>PPP</b>	Pakistan Preparedness Partnership
<b>SAN</b>	Social Accountability Network
<b>SAP PK</b>	South Asia Partnership-Pakistan
<b>SUN CSA</b>	Scaling-Up Nutrition Civil Society Alliance Pakistan
<b>SHAPE</b>	Strategic Humanitarian Assessment and Participatory Empowerment
<b>SPO</b>	Strengthening Participatory Organization
<b>ToGETHER</b>	Towards Greater Effectiveness and Timeliness in Humanitarian Emergency Response
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>UNOCHA</b>	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development





## THE RESEARCH STUDY

### 1.1 PURPOSE AND KEY QUESTIONS

This research was commissioned by the ToGETHER consortium of four German humanitarian NGOs (Caritas Germany, Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe and Malteser International). It is part of a series of eight country studies and one comparative analysis with other reports for Bangladesh, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Myanmar and Somalia. The analysis aims at informing the programme's efforts to advance localisation in these countries. Furthermore, it contributes to a wider translation into practice of the commitments that international agencies have made to support and reinforce rather than replace national and local crisis responders in their countries.

The guiding questions for all countries were:

- Which understandings of localisation of humanitarian aid exist among humanitarian actors?
- Which localisation initiatives and programs took place or are taking place in the respective country? Which initiatives and programs provide good practice?
- Where are in-country actors making good progress and what are the most significant challenges in the key areas of the localisation process - namely partnerships, financing, capacity development, coordination and complementarity, and gender?
- What institutional, policy and political dynamics influence these developments?
- What are the most urgent strategic issues and challenges that need to be addressed to realise substantive, transformative change?

### 1.2 OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGES

The questions invite a broad canvas or system perspective on the state of localisation. This provides an opportunity as it takes the localisation conversation beyond the bilateral relationships of an international relief actor and its partner(s). It also considers contextual constraining and enabling factors. Most global research on localisation since the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit has tended to focus on one single aspect (e.g. funding, coordination, gender and localisation, risk management, governmental policy towards international operational presence) (Van Brabant 2020). There is, to the researchers' knowledge, no significant precedent for a contextual system analysis.

The question where in-country actors are making good progress and where there are significant challenges is hard to answer, when there are hundreds of multilaterals, bilateral, national and local governmental and non-governmental actors. All the more so if their multitude of institutional, policy and political dynamics is to be examined as well. Further, there can be significant contextual differences between sub-national contexts within a country. This is also true for Pakistan.



## 1.3 INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORKS AND METHODS

### A FRAMEWORK

The research looks at localisation as a multi-dimensional issue. In 2017, GMI developed the Seven Dimensions framework of localisation for the Start Network, which emerged from extensive conversations with local and national actors in different countries (Patel & Van Brabant 2017). The framework has been tested and is used, sometimes with adaptations, by several other agencies, networks, or research groups.

RELATIONSHIP QUALITY	PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION	FUNDING & FINANCING	CAPACITY	COORDINATION MECHANISMS	POLICIES AND STANDARDS	VISIBILITY AND CREDIT SHARING
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• respectful and equitable</li> <li>• reciprocal transparency and accountability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• deeper participation of at-risk &amp; affected populations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• better quality</li> <li>• greater quantity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• sustainable organisations and collaborative capacities</li> <li>• stop undermining capacities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• national actors greater presence and influence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• national actors can contribute to and influence global and national policy and standards-development, and their application in their contexts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• roles, results and innovations by national actors are given credit and communicated about by international actors</li> </ul>

*Diagram 1.* Seven Dimensions framework of localisation

The guiding questions, for this and the other country assessments, focused on four of the seven dimensions: quality of relationship, finance, capacity, coordination, and one cross-cutting issue, gender and localisation.

### B METHODS

This report draws on a document review and interviews with key informants. The acquired information is analysed using the Seven Dimensions framework as described above.

**Document review:** The inquiry started with a literature review. ‘Localisation’ as a search word may yield some documents from after the World Humanitarian Summit and its Grand Bargain outcome document. But the dimensions of partnership, capacity-support for national and local actors, and the latter’s access to finance or meaningful participation in coordination structures, have a longer history. So too the support for women’s rights and women-focused national and local organisations. That can quickly lead to a substantive amount of literature, including older documents.

**Key informant interviews:** The whole research, including the country-level inquiry, took place during the global COVID-19 pandemic in the summer of 2020. Even where government regulations did not impose a total lockdown, duty-of-care considerations led to the decision to conduct the inquiry exclusively via online conversations and an online survey. Originally planned kick-off and feedback and validation workshops were not organised. While theoretically possible online, this assumes a convening power of the national researcher, good quality internet access of all participants, and the availability of the latter at the same time. One or more of these factors was often absent. Notwithstanding, 17 individual interviews were conducted, and 43 people participated in small group conversations online, one per province or region: Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) as well as one for residents in Islamabad. The survey was circulated via email and WhatsApp to 77 potential respondents. No less than 70 replied, a very high response rate. In addition, some brief ‘case examples’ were collected.



**Structure of the report:** In line with the above interpretive framework, the report first explores the context, with particular attention to the role of the federal government and the legal-political space for civil society. It then maps what could be identified as important localisation-relevant initiatives and localisation-conversations. Subsequently, more details are provided on the four dimensions investigated in particular, and on the cross-cutting issue of gender and localisation. The report concludes with a summary of the observations made.



## THE CONTEXT

### 2.1 A DISASTER-PRONE COUNTRY

Pakistan's geographical location, topography, meteorology, nature of the economy, rapid urbanisation and high population levels make it vulnerable to various natural and man-made hazards (Mehmood 2015). Pakistan is primarily affected by earthquakes, floods, hill torrents, monsoons, droughts, Glacier Lake Outburst flooding (GLOF) and cyclones. These disasters have had devastating consequences on socioeconomic systems and human development (Larsen, Oliver & Casiles Lanuza 2014). In addition to this, the country is affected by industrial disasters, heatwaves, droughts, disease epidemics, fires, accidents (road, rail, and air), and civil and military armed operations. The recent COVID-19 crisis has posed new challenges to the people, health system and economy of Pakistan (Sarwar et al 2020). It is causing a significant reversal of development gains. Over the past two decades, the poverty rate had declined by 40 percent to 24.3 percent in 2015. The IMF now projects a sharp reversal which could again push 40% of the population below the poverty line. Because of pandemic control measures, nearly 42 million children are now out of school, while 17 million children under five are missing routine vaccinations. An additional 2.45 million people—on top of a prior 40 million—now suffer food insecurity (UNDP 2020). The country has experienced negative growth rates for some months (Sareen 2020).

### 2.2 DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONALISATION AND LOCALISATION

The dynamic processes of internationalisation and localisation, and the nature of localisation, is influenced by different contextual factors. Key in this is the role of Government, which chooses to what degree to develop its own public sector capacities and exercise leadership, and the space and roles it gives to national and local non-governmental actors, and international ones.

During the period of military government (1999-2008), Pakistan was hit by earthquakes and floods and the military played the role of key actor in the overall response. Before the earthquake of October 8th 2005 in Northern Pakistan, the Government had established no system or authority to manage such crises. As soon as the relief and rescue activities started restoring the life in the affected areas, involving large-scale help from the people of Pakistan, local organisations, international assistance actors and the armed forces, the Government of Pakistan established the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) to lead the rebuilding operation. Its staff consisted of civil servants, armed forces personnel, and international consultants. The role of the ERRA was to undertake the macro-planning and work this out in sectoral strategies, financing, project approval and monitoring and evaluation. Along with that, the State Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (AJK) and Provincial Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (KP) were established as counterparts of ERRA to coordinate and facilitate the reconstruction and rehabilitation work at state and provincial level. ERRA had the additional responsibility to facilitate the work of the various operational partners. Though the armed forces did play a significant role, the 2005 earthquake brought a significantly larger number of international aid agencies to the country. UN agencies also started playing a much more pronounced role in disaster management. Pakistan was the first country in the world where the cluster system was implemented (Cochrane 2008). That trend was further reinforced with the large-scale and





deadly floods in 2010 that affected large areas of Sindh, Baluchistan, Punjab, Gilgit Baltistan and KP and caused major socio-economic damage. During the period of military government (1999-2008), Pakistan was hit by earthquakes and floods and the military played the role of key actor in the overall response. Before the earthquake of October 8th 2005 in Northern Pakistan, the Government had established no system or authority to manage such crises. As soon as the relief and rescue activities started restoring the life in the affected areas, involving large-scale help from the people of Pakistan, local organisations, international assistance actors and the armed forces, the Government of Pakistan established the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) to lead the rebuilding operation. Its staff consisted of civil servants, armed forces personnel, and international consultants. The role of the ERRA was to undertake the macro-planning and work this out in sectoral strategies, financing, project approval and monitoring and evaluation. Along with that, the State Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (AJK) and Provincial Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (KP) were established as counterparts of ERRA to coordinate and facilitate the reconstruction and rehabilitation work at state and provincial level. ERRA had the additional responsibility to facilitate the work of the various operational partners. Though the armed forces did play a significant role, the 2005 earthquake brought a significantly larger number of international aid agencies to the country. UN agencies also started playing a much more pronounced role in disaster management. Pakistan was the first country in the world where the cluster system was implemented (Cochrane 2008). That trend was further reinforced with the large-scale and deadly floods in 2010 that affected large areas of Sindh, Baluchistan, Punjab, Gilgit Baltistan and KP and caused major socio-economic damage.

### 2.3 GOVERNMENTAL ARCHITECTURE FOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Realising the need then for a management authority that can respond to different types of natural disasters and calamities, the Federal Government established the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) under NDMA Act 2010.

The National Disaster Management (NDM) Ordinance was promulgated in December 2006 and became the NDM Act in 2010 with the approval of the Parliament. After the 18th amendment of the constitution, disaster management is a provincial subject. Therefore, under the NDM Act 2010, a three-tier disaster management regime has been adopted. In this three-tier system, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) is the focal point at federal level, the Provincial/State Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) are the focal point for DRM endeavours in the respective provinces and District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMA) on the district levels. These developments indicate a taking of ownership of disaster management and a strengthening of national public capacities. In that sense they are a step towards localisation. The translation into practice runs into various challenges, such as an additional responsibility for public servants without additional resources, turnover of civil servants which makes it difficult to maintain technical expertise, a risk of political considerations influencing disaster response at local level etc. (e.g. Gita Srikandini et al 2018).

The National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) headed by the prime minister has been established for the elaboration of overall policies, guidelines, etc. NDMA at federal level prepares the National Plan to be approved by the National Commission and implements, coordinates and monitors the implementation of the national policy. Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) are responsible for implementing policies and plans



for disaster management in the provinces and regions. PDMA's also design the provincial disaster management policy obtaining the approval of the Provincial Commission. They coordinate response in the event of disaster and provide necessary technical assistance or give advice to district authorities and departments.

District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMA's) act as the district planning, coordinating and implementing body for disaster management and take all measures for the purposes of disaster management in the district in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the National Authority and the Provincial Authority.

The NDMA is mandated to act as the implementing, coordinating and monitoring body for all kinds of disasters. It provides technical assistance to the provincial governments and authorities to develop and prepare their plans in accordance with the guidelines provided by the National Commission. In the event of any threat of disaster, the NDMA issues guidelines and coordinates with other national and local authorities for directives. Creating awareness and disseminating education on disaster management is also a responsibility of the NDMA, as well as mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into development programmes and projects.

The NDMA's organizational structure is divided into three wings: Administration & Finance (A&F), Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and Operations (OPS). The DRR wing's functions include risk reduction policies, risk insurance, flood-related issues, disaster awareness and serving as secretariat for the National Disaster Management Committee (NDMC). Its core roles are:

- Implementing, executing projects and evaluating all matters related to the National Disaster Management Plan (NDMP).
- Monitoring and evaluating plans, strategies at national, provincial, district level as well as civil sector.
- Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into the development sector.
- Managing international cooperation, global frameworks and regional organizations.
- Coordinating with United Nations Agencies, bilateral/multilateral organisations and international non-government organisations (INGOs) / non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

In addition to this, in December 2016, the NDMA also established a government owned not-for-profit institution, the National Disaster Risk Management Fund (NDRMF) to mobilise finance towards enhanced and effective mitigation and a reduction of disaster risk. In practice today, the NDMA can also be called upon to respond to situations where city governments have failed to perform their duties effectively. For example, in the summer of 2020, the NDMA was requested to assist in cleaning drainage nullahs of Karachi, which had been choked by garbage, causing urban flooding. Over the years, the capacity of the NDMA/PDMA's to respond to disasters and emergencies has improved considerably. Both can now manage small to medium scale emergencies on their own without international support.

For the COVID-19 pandemic, however, the lead was given to another structure i.e., the National Command and Operations Centre (NCOC), established especially for this crisis. It is led by the Federal Ministry of Planning and Development with also army support in the background.

Under the current government that took office for 5 years in August 2018, some significant initiatives are moving forward related to disaster management and climate change. The



Hydromet & Disaster Risk Management Services Project has been initiated to strengthen Pakistan's public sector delivery of reliable and timely hydro-meteorological and disaster risk management services. USD 188 million of the total project amount (USD 210 million) is committed by the World Bank and will be implemented over the period of five years (2019-2024). Another important initiative is the Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) II Project, particularly in mountainous areas of KP and Gilgit Baltistan. The objective is to strengthen the resilience of communities that are likely to be affected by GLOF. The Ministry of Climate Change has initiated this project in 12 districts of KP and Gilgit Baltistan (2018-2023). Pakistan in 2020 emerged as one of the countries to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 13 on climate action.

## 2.4 PAKISTAN'S PRIVATE SECTOR AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT

The private sector also suffers major physical and financial losses and damages from disasters. Not surprisingly, particularly large enterprises have long since contributed to disaster response and recovery, by providing vital expertise, skills and resources. To make businesses more resilient and to ensure investment by the private sector in disaster risk reduction/preparedness processes, the private sector was included in the Pakistan Preparedness Partnership (PRP), a platform to increase interface between government, private sector and other stakeholders. The Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FPCCI) — which coordinates with a vast number of private sector partners across the country — was included as a member in the country steering committee (Asian Disasters Preparedness Partnership 2018a).

Private sector companies also engage with humanitarian actions, as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Many bigger corporations have even turned their CSR activities into regular community-based organisations (CBOs) towards particular sets of welfare and humanitarian actions. Standard Chartered Bank, Coca-Cola, Engro Pakistan and Jazz now support many other CBOs in their community-based activities. Nevertheless, private sector engagement in disaster response is not devoid of common and distinctive challenges (Bassey 2016).

The research conversations with CSOs revealed the private sector to be a significant actor towards more localised humanitarian and development response. Some corporates have their own development wings where they set up infrastructure, particularly in areas where they have a commercial interest. Organizations like the Engro Foundation and the Hashoo Foundation are now considered to be among the leading NGOs in Pakistan. On the other hand, the private sector has its own vested interests. Until they are brought to the table by the Government, they will not expand their horizon towards broader aspects of disaster management. It is the responsibility of the government to build a public-private-civil society partnership in order to increase the productivity and sustainability of the emergency response mechanism.

On the other hand, the growing role of international for-profit consulting and contractor firms, which hand out the majority of the large-scale funding from donors like FCDO, USAID and EU has become another contributing factor in the declining access to funding for CSOs. These contractors often implement the projects directly, hiring local staff. However, sometimes they do not understand the local context and they also have their business interests at heart. These business interests do not always coincide with people's preferences.



# 2


“We started working for disasters in 2010, we experienced that in flood response and displacement, tent distribution is also a business. The vendors of these tents are usually sitting in European countries or America and they are being imported from there through UN agencies. Since in Pakistan we usually experience flooding in monsoon or more particularly in hot weathers, while distributing the tents, we realized that they are useless for the affected communities, because in hot season the people cannot even stay in the tents for a little while; they instead use these for saving their assets and personal belongings but they cannot live in it. We started lobbying around it and tried to find some local solution for it. We ended up giving them something which they could use as tent during displacement and when they go back to their houses, they could take the assets with them to make a roof for their houses; we scientifically designed the number of required items, e.g. plastic sheets, bamboos and other relevant material which would help them build tent first and a roof later. We had to fight with the UN agencies.; this is our journey from globalization to localisation.”

(Executive Director of a National NGO from Sindh)



## NGOs, CSOs, CBOs AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Pakistan has a large number of community-based and civil society organisations. Their numbers have significantly increased over the past 20 years. As the diagram 2 shows, their areas of focus can be diverse. Those that are active in emergency response typically will also have other focus areas of work.



**Diagram 2.** Areas of focus of CSOs in Pakistan.

As we can see, 49.35 % reported that they were involved in some kind of emergency response during the last five years. A strict separation between relief and development, however, is not seen as justified. Most do development and advocacy work as well. The development work done in communities, often helps them with responding to the disasters more effectively. A separation between ‘development’ and ‘relief’ NGOs, at local level, makes little sense.

### 3.1 PRINCIPAL CSO PLATFORMS

The 2005 earthquake had not only been a catalyst for greater international aid agency presence, but also for the creation and development of more Pakistani CSOs. During the ‘recovery’, international relief agencies started engaging more with Pakistani CSOs, though these acted mostly as sub-contractors. (Qazi no date:7).

Following the return to civilian government in 2008, many Pakistani CSOs started coming together in alliances and networks. Today, the National Humanitarian Network (NHN) is the core platform for Pakistani CSO engagement around the localisation agenda. It was



set up in 2010 as a decentralized network of national CSOs in Pakistan, in response to a demand from the then Chair of the NDMA that he wanted a ‘single phone number’ he could call to reach local/national CSOs (Hoppe 2012) It is led by an elected Chair and Central Executive Committee nationally, with provincial chapters in five provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit Baltistan) and regional chapters in Islamabad and Azad Jammu & Kashmir. The national and provincial secretariats are typically housed in the organisation to which the respective Chairs belong. Focus areas are coordination, policy and procedural arrangements, capacity-building and knowledge management. A core objective of the NHN has been to engage with stakeholders throughout Pakistan for the promotion of humanitarian values by influencing policies and building capacities to ensure rights-based humanitarian responses. NHN also advocates for the allocation of greater resources for local organisations in different platforms. Currently, it has 147 members across Pakistan.

Prior to 2005, the comparatively low number of INGOs used to coordinate informally. In the context of the 2005 earthquake, with many more INGOs arriving, they created the Northern Areas Earthquake Relief Operation (NAERO). INGO coordination decreased somewhat between 2006 and 2008 but revived after counter-insurgency operations in Swat (since 2009) created large-scale humanitarian needs (Ibid). This evolved into the current Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF). The PHF has a mandate to represent INGOs collectively to the Government of Pakistan and UN agencies in order to build robust coordination, information dissemination and advocacy endeavours of the humanitarian sector. PHF now represents 43 INGOs working for development and humanitarian sectors in Pakistan. In addition to INGO Coordination meetings conducted, there are other groups which support coordination and coordination fora.

This makes Pakistan a quite exceptional example of structured NGO organisation, facilitating conversations and collaborations between the two types of NGO stakeholders (Emmens & Clayton 2017).

### 3.2 NATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL LEADERSHIP, CIVIL SOCIETY AND UN ALIGNMENT

The NDMA Act of 2010 states that the National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) will also include representatives of civil society, or any other person, appointed by the Prime Minister. It also states that at district level, local authorities will coordinate with NGOs along with all other stakeholders for effective disaster response and management. Also relevant are the *National Policy Guidelines for Vulnerable Groups in Disaster (2014)* in which local CSOs, INGOs and even private and public sectors were invited to an inclusive consultative process. In the first years, close cooperation ensued between the NDMA and the NHN and PHF (Khan & Ali 2015).

The UN system also aligned closely with the Government institutional set-up. The Government of Pakistan has “*the primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory. The HCT (Humanitarian Country Team) supports the Government in these efforts and maintains regular engagement with NDMA and other relevant government bodies to ensure coordinated preparedness for enabling timely, effective and principled action*” (National Humanitarian Network 2018).



### 3.3 DECREASING SPACE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

In November 2013, however, the Government of Pakistan introduced a new policy and stringent rules by establishing a new registration process for all NGOs receiving foreign funding. This has to be seen in the context of a deteriorating internal security situation. Terrorist attacks by the Pakistani Taliban and by groups supported by al-Qaeda, as well as violence among rival sects and against religious minorities, afflicted both major cities and smaller towns. There have been more than 70,000 terrorism-related fatalities since 2008. The surging violence prompted counter-operations by the security forces and an increasingly security-focused mindset in state agencies (Khan Mohamand 2020).

The new policy introduced much greater scrutiny and tighter regulations about foreign funding to all local, national and international NGOs working in the country. The Economic Coordination Committee of the then Cabinet approved policies requiring groups receiving foreign funding to declare their finances and activities. Organizations must undertake a security clearance process. Whereas previously, the responsibility for monitoring and security clearance of NGOs was only with the Economic Affairs Division, now additional clearances at national and sub-national level are required, involving the Ministry of the Interior and, in a quasi-formal way, the security agencies (Emmens & Clayton 2017). The application of the policies led to the refusal of visas, the introduction of very complex registration requirements, and layers of approval required for new projects (Naviwala 2017).

The result is a much more restrictive regulation of international funding: (i) local NGOs must register with the government before using foreign monies, services, and goods and must sign MoUs with the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) of government stipulating, among other things, their geographical areas of work; (ii) INGOs receiving foreign contributions require prior registration exclusively with the Interior Ministry (Fariduddin 2017). The INGOs are required to submit comprehensive documentation to MoI for getting the MoU, which is issued for one year only. The regulatory framework is comprised of multiple laws that are not integrated with each other, and the authority to register and provide oversight is not held by a single government body (Fariduddin 2017). That makes the whole registration process complex, very time-consuming and highly uncertain. According to the civil society stakeholders, such restrictions are limiting their resources and scope of work in humanitarian and development roles. The government is trying to introduce a uniform law for the registration of NGOs, but this is also not without faults and ramifications and thus strongly opposed by NGOs.


Due to the cumbersome and complex procedure of registration and requirement of layered documents, the situation has become a struggle for survival for many local NGOs/CSOs which have firm foundations in their communities. In fact, a lot of stakeholders believe that the establishment of the NDMRF also weakens Pakistani CSOs because it can exploit the funding and investment opportunities that CSOs could have benefited from. The distancing from civil society by government can also be gauged by the instance of *Ehsaas* programme 2020. This is a very large program by the government and has many components. The programme is for the extreme poor, orphans, widows, the homeless, the disabled, those who risk medical impoverishment, for the jobless, for poor farmers, for labourers, for the sick and undernourished, for students from low-income backgrounds and for poor women and elderly citizens. The *Ehsaas* programme was also mandated to respond to the situation created by



COVID-19 and under which 1.2 trillion Pakistani rupees were distributed among the needy and deserving. It is carried out without involvement of CSOs, leading to many deserving families not receiving the support for lack of community outreach and mobilisation by the Government.


A survey was used to develop a better understanding of the context in which CSOs are currently operating in Pakistan. The respondents included national, international, and local NGOs and CBOs, private foundations and research institutes. Major findings are summarised here:

**A.** Most respondents registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860 followed by the Social Welfare Act 1961. Both these laws are weak in terms of accountability and reporting (diagram 3). While updated and streamlined legislation is welcome in principle, NGOs feel that scrutiny and re-registration of NGOs under the newly enacted ‘Charities Act 2020’ will take a very long time, suspending meanwhile their ability to act, and exposing them to too much government interference in NGO affairs.



**Diagram 3.** Responses to the October 2020 survey about the (then) current status of re-registration.

**B.** Most of the NGOs are struggling with the new regulations introduced by the Government of Pakistan. The new policy makes it mandatory to obtain a MoU from the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) if the organisation wants to receive foreign funding. If they do have foreign funding, they are not required to get a MoU. However, the process of obtaining the MoU is so long and difficult that only a small percentage of the NGOs are able to actually receive one (diagram 4: Status of MoU with EAD). The survey revealed that to date only 12.16% NGOs had received the MoU. The EAD website shows that to date only 341 NGOs have been awarded MoUs. According to the EAD, 461 NGOs have submitted their complete documents but have not yet received MoUs. Given the lengthy process, several of the MOUs received have already expired. This means that a very limited number of the NGOs are now eligible for foreign funding directly or through INGOs. This situation has not only made survival of NGOs very difficult as a lot of NGOs in Pakistan are dependent on support from international partners, but has also created a lot of issues in managing an effective and efficient response in case of any dis-



**Diagram 4.** Status of MoU with EAD





aster or emergency, as most of the local NGOs are not now eligible to receive direct or indirect foreign funding. However, for COVID-19, NGOs were exempted from the requirement of obtaining MoUs for 6 months initially.

“The process is so long and frustrating. It has been over two years since we submitted our request for MoU. There have been numerous verifications. We have also visited the office on so many occasions. Now, after almost two years, we have been informed that we shall get MoU.”

(Executive Director of a National NGO)

“The process of obtaining MoUs is so long and lengthy. Sometimes, it takes years to complete. By the time the MoU is received, the project for which MoU had been applied is already finished. Many donors get frustrated as projects are not able to take off.”

(Program manager of a local NGO in Punjab)

A research study "Defining National Interest in Human Development"(Aslan & Jacob 2019) assessing the impact of Pakistan's INGOs/NGOs regulation Policy, in the Economic, Developmental and Relational Markers identifies that the stringent regulation policy for INGOs will gravely affect international relations, dissuade the international community (donors & civil society) from providing support to human development, and increase unemployment, while the foreign investments will become tougher to attract in the face of lack of protection for civil liberties, especially when the country profile on health, education, employment, human rights and environment is already amongst the lowest in the world (Abbas 2019).



## LOCALISATION INITIATIVES AND CONVERSATIONS

### 4.1 LOCALISATION INITIATIVES

The Start Network and the National Humanitarian Network have been two important actors towards the objective of strong Pakistani capabilities to deal with all types of crises generating humanitarian needs, with international agencies more in a supporting and reinforcing role. The key moment in the Start Network's engagement with Pakistani civil society was the July 2017 conference titled '*The Future of Humanitarian Action in Pakistan*'. The objective of the event was to explore what an ideal future might look like and how stakeholders in Pakistan might reorient themselves to get there. More than 125 representatives from national and international civil society organisations, donors, UN agencies and government officials participated in the conference. In September 2017, the NHN and the Start Network entered into close collaboration.

A Realization Committee was formed to pursue the vision of strong Pakistani leadership. The committee came up with a business case that was approved by the Start Global Assembly and Board. In that context, the Start Network, via ACTED, supported the NHN with the coordination of the response to the Mirpur earthquake. The NHN also arranged a National Conference, serving as a forum for stakeholders reflecting on the earthquake response. Based on the consultations a plan was streamlined and local stakeholders were also trained in emergency response mechanisms. Additionally, a learning initiative was initiated to reflect more deeply on actual experiences, the context and institutional set-ups, best practices and gaps, and to make use of identified success factors to feed into a model for localised coordination mechanisms for medium-scale disasters in Pakistan (Start Network 2020).

Pakistan is also one of the five countries where the Shifting the Power (StP) project has been implemented. StP aimed to strengthen the capacity and influence of local and national humanitarian actors, and to contribute to the development of a more balanced humanitarian system. It was led by a consortium of six INGOs: ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Concern, Oxfam and Tearfund. Currently Concern and Oxfam have their active offices in Pakistan. ActionAid was banned from working in Pakistan in 2018, due to new registration policies. The project was comprised of five 'outputs', relating to capacity strengthening, supporting representation and voice of local partners, consortium member INGOs 'walking the talk', collaboration with other DEPP projects, and learning and evidence sharing. The NHN was also part of the steering committee of the StP in Pakistan.

There are also a few Pakistani CSOs that are formal endorsers of Charter 4 Change, such as the Community Uplift Programme, the Community World Service Asia, the Foundation for Rural Development, the Research and Development Foundation, SHARP (Pakistan Society for Human Rights and Prisoners' Aid) and the Strengthening Participation Organisation.

### 4.2 LOCALISATION CONVERSATIONS

Prior to the May 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the NHN developed a briefing paper on the Agenda for Humanity, and a Position Paper for the Summit itself (NHN no dates). It has since commissioned various studies (Qazi no date and 2015) and published several localisation-related short papers (e.g. Memon 2015).

The NHN also demonstrates clear awareness that the relevant Grand Bargain commitments (localisation but also participation revolution) are not new. In another short note '*Localising*




*Humanitarian Action*, it appropriately refers e.g. to the 1994 Code of Conduct, the CHS standard, the Sphere Standards, the C4C, and DFID and USAID's humanitarian policies.

In recent years, the pace of progress on localisation has slackened to a great extent. The capacity building program started by the NHN and UNOCHA with support from many international organizations came to a halt after just one workshop in Punjab, which could not be replicated in other provinces. Other initiatives could not continue either as envisioned earlier. The process has been hampered by many factors. The introduction of a new policy of registration for INGOs and national NGOs, the requirement of the MoU for starting new projects and generally a hostile environment for NGOs and civil society sectors have adversely affected the process of localisation. Major INGOs like ActionAid, Plan International and World Vision, which were actively pursuing and supporting the agenda of localisation, had to close their country offices in Pakistan as a result of the new policies introduced by the government. All the above-mentioned INGOs were not only actively pursuing the agenda of localisation as part of their global mandate but were also financially supporting the capacity building programs for the local actors.

Meanwhile, many Pakistani CSOs are struggling with the situation. They find it extremely difficult to obtain MoUs for their projects. Provincial governments are also introducing new laws for the registration of NGOs. In Punjab alone, more than 35000 NGOs were de-notified due to various reasons. In circumstances where local CSOs are struggling for recognition and the means to operate, advocating for deeper localisation is difficult. The review is, however, also intended to identify inactive or fake 'NGOs' and organisations whose actions are not to support people in distress.

Currently, the NHN and its provincial chapters are the main platforms and are primary spaces for discussion on localisation. All the discussions about localisation have been led by NHN so far. Apart from the NHN, Balochistan Development Network (BDN) is also holding discussions about localisation. BDN is a local network, with 25 local organisations of Balochistan as members, BDN is supported by the Government of Balochistan (GoB). START Network is another platform, where discussions about localisation are taking place. NDMA, UNOCHA, INGOs and NHN members have been participating in these discussions.

Though there have been vigorous discussions and deliberations about localisation in the above-mentioned platforms, it was felt that the discussions are not broad-based and inclusive.



**Diagram 5.** Participation in discussion about localisation

Only a limited number of stakeholders are involved and the NGOs sector at large has either remained aloof or has not been engaged yet. Focus group discussion with local NGOs in all the four provinces and Islamabad revealed that only a handful of them had participated in these discussions. Though some of them were familiar with the concept of localisation, they had not taken part in any discussion about it and neither were they aware of any progress and development in this direction.

The results of the survey corroborate the findings of FGDs and KIIs. When asked if they had participated in discussions about localisation, the majority of the NGOs i.e., 63.63% responded that they had never been part of any such discussion (diagram 5: Participation in discussions about Localisation).



The research revealed that the understanding about localisation also varies among different stakeholders, as diagram 6 shows. For many respondents, localisation is not a new concept. They consider it rephrasing and repackaging of the earlier concepts of capacity building and empowerment of local actors. The results from the survey were of a similar nature and showed that there is no uniform understanding of localisation among NGOs in Pakistan. Of the respondents, 67.12 % think that localisation means the response must be locally led. They feel that local actors and stakeholders have a better understanding of the context and thus should lead the process. 28.77% saw localisation as 'nationalisation', at least in the sense of having response teams of national staff. 28.9 % were of the opinion that localisation meant decentralisation: instead of making decisions and plans at national or provincial level, the disaster plans and response should be led by local actors.




Diagram 6. Interpretations of localisation

The ambiguity also manifests itself when different views are contrasted with each other. For example, the 2017 Charter of Commitments, signed up to by the Shifting the Power consortium partners in Pakistan (Tearfund, CAFOD, Concern and Oxfam) states that: “*The StP supports local humanitarian actors to take their place alongside international actors to ensure that optimum benefits reach the crisis-affected people. The purpose is to enable the local actors to be the agents of promising humanitarian actions at the grassroots.*”

This does not immediately correspond to the perspective of one prominent member of Pakistani civil society:

« Localisation of humanitarian response will have several advantages over the present model. Shifting steering to the national civil society will considerably reduce the cost of operations. International organisations have much higher administrative cost as their employees draw hefty salaries and perks. In case of expatriate staff, special arrangements are required for their residence, security and mobility. (...) Local civil society also has an advantage of having easier access and acceptability within the communities. Understanding of local socio-cultural and political undercurrents equips it with ability to find local solutions to local problems.”

(Memon 2015)

One sensitive issue is the registration as national CSO of what previously was an INGO. Two examples are Islamic Relief and Community World Service Asia (CWSA), which evolved from the US organisation Church World Service. This can be difficult from different angles: the international entity may feel it loses control and opportunity in a country, while home-grown organisations may feel these new ‘national’ entities have an unfair advantage of more experience with and continued connections to international actors and resources. The issue is receiving some global attention (Open Letter 2020).

Lack of a proper roadmap and a business model to follow or adapt, despite already long deliberations and discussions, were also cited as the reasons for lack of strong progress on localisation in Pakistan and elsewhere. It was felt that it was of the utmost importance to agree upon such and a ‘model’ for localisation. Such model will provide a structure for sharing of the risk and responsibility between the donors and local organizations. Donors need to



know who will share the risk if they fund the local organisations and in case the results are not as expected. In such scenarios, the donors prefer to deal with one humanitarian office of government, instead of supporting hundreds of local organisations

Another issue that emerged from the research was that of registration of the international organisations as national ones. Several international organisations have now registered as Pakistani entities, to avoid the government restrictions on INGOs. Respondents from local organisations felt that these organisations do not really qualify as 'national' and were now competing with the home-grown national NGOs for an already shrinking pie.



## DIMENSIONS OF LOCALISATION

As described above, the analytical framework used here is that of the Seven Dimensions. This research focusses attention on four of them (relationship, finance, capacities and coordination).

### 5.1 QUALITY OF RELATIONSHIP

Following the increased presence of international relief agencies in Pakistan as of 2005, the initial but also long-prevailing relationship with local/national CSOs was one of a patron-client type; sub-contracting 'service-provider', typically for the duration of a project (Qazi no date and 2015). Distrust or a trust deficit is a factor affecting the relationship, as in many other countries (Start Network et al. 2017).

One outcome of the Start Network's Shifting the Power project in Pakistan, has been a Charter of Commitments, that in the first place engages the INGOs that came together in the project (Action Aid, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam, CAFOD and Tearfund – the latter four of which were driving the project in Pakistan, with Tearfund as lead agency). The Charter of Commitment includes one related to partnerships. Though many of the INGOs working in Pakistan have not yet signed the charter as some of them are not involved in the disaster response, yet in principle all the INGOs agreed to it. During discussions with representatives of the INGOs in Pakistan, almost all discussed the commitment of their organizations to strengthen the civil society in Pakistan and to engage the civil society organizations in more meaningful partnerships. However, the requirements of the emphasis on the greater accountability and transparency in development work and disaster response, sometimes, creates a situation, where despite their commitment to the obligations, INGOs and donors get into agreements with local organizations which do not have the flexibility required for local NGOs to play their role more effectively. The new policies of financial controls become a hurdle in providing quality flexible funding to local organizations.

This subsequently led to the articulation of a detailed 'Partnership Framework and Guidelines' (NHN 2017). It grounds the partnerships in shared objectives and, appropriately, talks about underlying values and principles on which it should be built. It recognizes the importance of periodically reviewing, through in-house, independent or collaborative monitoring and evaluation, the quality of the partnership, and not only of the joint action, and talks about an end or exit of a partnership that is not constructive. Some further detail is provided in another reference document 'Partnership Marker' that pays attention to other important issues such as communications, decision-making, and dealing with conflicts. (The indications from

#### Charter of Commitments – Commitment 2 Collaboration

*"Formed medium- to long-term partnerships with local humanitarian actors to deliver faster, reliable and sustainable relief to crisis-affected communities".*

*The indicator: "The agency will, in collaboration with its local partners, carry out feasibility assessments to forge medium- to long-term strategic partnerships. Such strategic partnerships should identify all important ingredients of collaboration for the localisation of humanitarian action, also addressing local partners' capacity development requirements and their engagement as frontline actors to take charge of the humanitarian action. Achieving such partnerships is essential to deliver faster, more reliable and sustainable relief to crisis-affected communities. To achieve this, the agency will propose specific actions and link them to specific timelines in the Commitment Result Indicator monitoring framework."*



the documents are that it really relates only to Action Aid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Concern and Tearfund).

The research indicates, however, that the pressures resulting from a more restrictive operating environment, are negatively affecting the quality of collaboration. The stakeholders claim that their partnership has now turned into a short to medium term vendor/contractor/subcontractor deal which used to be equitable in the past. There used to be a time when the budget of any project was decided with the recommendations of both partners. The INGOs used to allocate funds for the strengthening of the partner organization and give them liberty to add their voice for the budget allocation specifically for community-based activities because the local partner is well aware of the ground realities and needs. As the partnership has been disrupted, so has the quality of funding opportunities.

“We have now been restricted to the role of mere contractors. We are expected to perform certain activities, which have already been decided by donors. We often do not have any say in the design of the project.”

(Executive Director of a local NGO from Punjab)

“We are helpless; they want us to do ‘pays for performance’. We don’t have any say; we have to do everything whatever the donor wants.”

(Executive Director of a local NGO from KP)

Most of the Pakistani CSOs involved in the research see the partnership with INGOs as not equitable. They described themselves as mere contractors rather than partners, with no meaningful role in decision-making or program design.

Respondents felt that most of the projects being funded have milestones-based budgets, which leaves no room for improvising, innovation, flexibility or even discussion with the donors. Calls for proposals typically extensively detail what the donor wants done and how. Some respondents felt that even country offices of the INGOs do not have the same say in the decision-making processes as they used to have. The programs being implemented in Pakistan are part of large-scale multi-country programs, in which almost the same set of activities are implemented in all countries.

“All the milestone based projects have only one purpose, i.e. there is a contractor who may have spent 7 rupees but you give them 10 rupees after the completion of task—in the past a chunk of funding was given for in-house capacity building so they can improve the partnership with INGO/donor.”

(Local NGO Representative from Punjab)

Local NGOs feel that they are not in a position to negotiate and bargain with the donors and INGOs, because of the financial constraints they are facing. They must accept whatever is offered to them, even if it is on bad terms and they feel strongly it is not fully adapted to a context. If they don’t take it, others will.

## 5.2 PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION

Researching, in a meaningful way, to what degree particularly INGOs and Pakistani CSOs work with strong participation (and not just ‘feedback’) from crisis-affected communities, was beyond the scope of this exercise. A few points are worth mentioning, however.



Action Aid commissioned research, published in 2009, identified the clear priority of accountability to donors over accountability – and genuine participation of – affected communities (Featherstone & Abouzeid 2010). Since then, there has been a lot of engagement by the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, currently the CHS Alliance, in Pakistan.

**Accountability outcome indicator:** “Ensured accountability to the crisis-affected communities”

**Definition of the indicator:** *The agency will make merit-based decisions during the selection of grantees (the local humanitarian actors), and while their contracts are supervised/administered during the course of humanitarian action. Relevant information about the grantees must be made available/provided (wherever possible) on demand (particularly to the communities they work with/for). The agency shall ensure utmost fairness by conforming to the spirit of localization of humanitarian action, as is emphasized by this document. The agency should intermittently engage the services of third party firms to obtain neutral opinion about the transparency and conduct of its partners. The agency must propose measures (actions and timelines) in the CRI monitoring framework to particularly evaluate the ethics, accountability and transparency factors of its partnership contracts.*

(Charter of Commitments)

The Charter of Commitments by the Shifting the Power project agencies explicitly refers to improved engagement with crisis-affected communities.

Note is to be taken, however, of a different complex dynamic of ‘localisation’, between socio-geographically ‘local’ and ‘national’ CSOs, which relates to what are appropriate roles and responsibilities for each in a particular crisis, given the understanding of the ‘local’ context.

However, if the trend of donors over-designing programmes and projects, whether they are implemented through a government institution, an INGO or a commercial contractor, is as strong as this research indicates, then the possibilities that those for whose benefit the intervention takes place, can actually co-design and co-decide, seem minimal.

### 5.3 FINANCE: ACCESS, QUANTITY AND QUALITY

The research shows that a large number of CSOs in Pakistan are small in size, in terms of budget and numbers of staff, and do not have sufficient resources to survive for long in the absence of external funding support.




Diagram 7. Size of NGO by budget (Pakistani rupees)




Diagram 8. Number of staff


Only about 9% of Pakistani CSOs can be considered ‘middle-sized’ with an annual budget of over 100 million PKR. By contrast, 82% of NGOs have an annual operating budget of less than five million Pakistani rupees and 75.32% have a team of less than 20 members. Most of these NGOs do not have financial reserves to sustain them through the time required for new registrations and obtaining of MoUs, neither do they have capital available for responding to any emergencies.





*"Overemphasis by the donors to spend sizeable amounts of funds in very limited periods of time, leading to non-responsive, rushed and sometimes non-transparent management of disaster response projects."*

(Qazi 2015:12)



**Diagram 9.** Source of funding

Though a significant number i.e., 44.16% of NGOs reported that they receive donations from individuals and 46.47% reported that they get membership fees as well, most of the time the membership fees are very insignificant and these NGOs remain dependent on different sources of international funding as evident from diagram 9. Most of the NGOs still depend on the funding from INGOs and UN organisations with offices in Pakistan. However, there are also 15.5 % of organisations that get direct international funding i.e., international organisations which do not have their offices in Pakistan.

The small sizes mean they are not able to absorb a larger grant rapidly and effectively. While donors tend to see this as a weakness, CSOs have expressed concerns about the administratively and politically driven pressure to spend.

The National Disaster Risk Management Fund (NDRMF) is, as mentioned, a government-run fund. It provides matching grants up to 70%, which means that recipients need to bring in 30% from other sources. It is accessible to UN agencies, public sector entities and international and national non-governmental ones. Pakistani CSOs sometimes find it difficult to raise 30% matching fund, which is a prerequisite for applying for this grant, while it is easier for the INGOs to raise the 30 % of funds from their own resources.

The Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) is another state-owned entity that receives significant amounts of international funding, as does the National Rural Support Programme (NRSP). They do reduce the funding available to CSOs. On the other hand, the NRSP is a significant player in organising and supporting village- and community-based organisations.

Much more accessible to Pakistani CSOs is the Pakistan Humanitarian Fund, originally called the 'Emergency Response Fund' (first established in 2010) managed by OCHA. OCHA today works very closely with the NDMA on all projects related to Emergency Response Preparedness. This Fund is accessible for local NGOs through regular calls issued by OCHA. In 2016 for example, out of 355 organisations funded, 226 were local/national, receiving USD 43 million out of the USD 73 million disbursed. (Qazi no date:12) During the 2018 emergency response, 83% of funds from the humanitarian pool fund were allocated to local organizations as opposed to the global target of 25%. During the COVID-19 pandemic response, so far 100% of the grants approved went to local organisations. According to UNOCHA, since 2016, approx. 60 million USD have been provided for responding to different disasters and



emergencies in all parts of Pakistan. On average 80% of the grants went to local organisations. OCHA is scaling down in Pakistan and may be replaced by a Humanitarian Assistance Team (HAT). The implications for the Pakistan Humanitarian Fund are not yet clear.

**RAPID Fund Program:** Financed by USAID, Concern Worldwide has been running this Fund since 2009. Between its start and sometime in 2017, it worked with 97 NGOs of which 73 were local/national ones, and had allocated some US\$ 44 million to NGOs, of which US\$ 34 million were to local/national ones (Qazi no date; CONCERN Worldwide 2019). The Fund continues.

Formal member agencies (INGOs or national ones) can directly access grants from the Start Fund. This is particularly set up to be a very fast mechanism for the most immediate response, as the access to other funding, which involves administrative procedures, takes more time. The last alert response was for the December 2019 earthquake that hit Kashmir and Mirpur. Half of the funds disbursed went to INGOs, the other half to Pakistani CSOs. Currently HANDS, BRSP, IDEA and the Help Foundation are formal members of Start in Pakistan.

Comparative global experience has shown that standing emergency funds, and the integration of such 'surge funding' with quality funding to sustain organisational capabilities, are an important component of effective 'rapid response' capability (Austin & O'Neil 2018).

**“... the donor is ready to fund the locals and let the locals make decisions but if there is loss, who will share the risk of loing the million dollars. We do not have any model where we can share the risk or responsibility if any local organization misuses the funds or end up in corruption”**

(Country Director of an INGO)

**“Some donors introduced this 'theka-system (contracting system); you will get money for this if you do this and salary, operational cost and all the things are mixed up in the name of 'milestone-based grants' – every organization is doing the same thing now. How can quality be maintained”**

(Head of a CBO from Punjab)

The quality of funding to Pakistani CSOs from traditional, mostly Western sources, particularly for disaster-related work, has declined. Most of the funding available to NGOs and CSOs has no or little flexibility, rather it is very restricted and limiting. The donor dictates the number of staff, their salaries, their duration etc. and the type of activities to be implemented, with no support for organizational management cost or the cost of the support staff. The duration of projects has also been decreased, which has had an adverse impact on the quality of the implementation.


The COVID-19 situation has brought in a new aspect: pressure from donors to increase the ICT dimension of project work, with a related reduction in expenses on travel, hotels, meeting rooms etc. Direct interaction is to be replaced by online communication. To illustrate the implications: A planned activity of the South Asia Partnership will be conducted when the impact of the pandemic subsides, but its planned budget has now been cut by 75%. This transformation is being looked at both ways. Some CSOs are optimistic to bring this change in their systems and getting upgraded in pace with the global world while many local CSOs (specifically the ones working at grass-root level or community-based only) believe that this will hamper learning and empowering opportunities for them.

The lack of flexibility of funding is a result of donors' desire to reduce risk and increase efficiency. Lack of trust in the capacities of local partners, both financial and managerial,



has resulted in donors designing the whole program and engaging the local actors as mere implementers. Another strategy adopted by the donors is the engagement of contractors and consultancy firms. These contractors then hire local organizations and NGOs as sub-contractors to carry out pre-defined activities in the field. These risk reduction strategies adopted by the donors have indeed resulted in greater financial control for the donors but have left little room for the local NGOs and CSOs to operate.

Fortunately, funding from the traditional international relief sector is not the only possible source of finance.



**Diagram 10.** Source of Funding for Disaster and Emergency Response

The above diagram shows that INGOs and other donors provide significant support during emergencies and disasters, yet they are not the major source of funding for disaster and emergency response. The majority of the organizations, i.e. 44.5% reported that they also receive significant support through local philanthropy. The COVID-19 responses, for example, are largely financed through local philanthropy and donations. Al Khidmat Foundation from KP province reported providing support to deserving families and distributing goods worth billions of PKR. Most faith-based organisations depend on local philanthropy and donations for managing their response.

“We have provided goods, food items and cash support worth 2 billion rupees to deserving families across KP. We have done all this through our own resources and own network.”

(Programme Manager of a faith based organisation)

Organizations getting support from Muslim countries are also important players during disaster response. Organizations like Qatar Charity and Dubai Care are such organizations. But most of the time these organizations keep themselves limited to charity work like distribution of goods and money to the people in need. These organizations provide support to local organizations during disaster and emergency response. Islamic Relief, which has now registered itself as a local organisation in Pakistan, also gets significant funding from Muslim countries through donations and charity. It directly implements disaster and emergency response programs without local partners.

Still, a global reduction in Official Development Aid, except perhaps in health and water-related sectors, could have major negative consequences for CSO capabilities and contributions in disaster management and even development.



The zero-risk tolerance and risk transfer strategies of donors in the relief sector contrast with continued direct funding of Pakistani CSOs for other types of work. For example, The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) funds more than 20 organizations in Pakistan without having an office in the country. Other examples are Bread for the World, the Netherlands Embassy, Christian Study Center, and the Japanese government, which directly fund Pakistani civil society organizations. “Ujala” which is a Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights programme supported by Amplify Change Fund and implemented by AWAZ Foundation is also a good example of direct funding to Pakistani organizations. However, most of these direct funding initiatives have been going on for a long time and are not the result of a localisation policy.

#### 5.4 CAPACITIES

All the stakeholders who participated in the discussions through FGDs and KII felt that over the years, the national capacity to respond to disasters and emergencies has improved and Pakistan has come a long way since the 2005 earthquake. The National Disaster Management Authority, the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMAs) and the District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs) have been established. There is, however, variable capacity between different provinces and a tendency to be more focused on response than on disaster risk reduction. As is the case in other countries, local administrations are not necessarily adequately resourced to effectively fulfil their formal responsibilities.

“Yet there is generational progress in capacity building of local actors; where there wasn't any organization at some point, there are many now and they are working splendidly. The only strengthening we need to do on broader scale is taking all the local organisations on board who have built their capacities on one or other thing, we should now give them technical expertise on different things like finances, audit, reporting and build their institutional capacities for disaster response.”

(Disaster Management Specialist from civil society)

“Pakistan has been able to produce best human resource in disaster management and emergency response. That's why you see dozens of Pakistani professionals working in all countries where there is a disaster situation or emergency. We have been great exporters of human resources for disaster and emergency response.”

(Head of an INGO working in Pakistan)

On the other hand, the opinions about the capacity of the civil society organizations vary. Generalisations of course cannot be made for such a large number of CSOs. Perspectives are also influenced by the reference one uses: the rapidly increasing and ever more demanding requirements and standards of international relief actors, or e.g. where Pakistani CSOs were twenty years ago.

Training workshops appear to have been, and possibly remain, a favourite approach to ‘capacity-development’, even if their impact, if conducted as largely stand-alone events, has long been proven to be very limited at best. An example is the 2 day “*Joint Capacity Building Training for Proposal Writers on ‘Mainstreaming gender, protection, gender-based violence and accountability to affected populations in humanitarian programming’*”, in Peshawar, in October 2016. In 2017, OCHA together with the NHN and with further support from Action Aid, Plan International and World Vision, started a programme to strengthen the emergency response capacities of local CSOs, as they are the first responders. A five-day workshop was held in Lahore, with a




few online follow-up meetings. But further activities did not materialise as these INGOs had to confront obstacles to their continued presence in Pakistan.

The Consortium for Natural Disaster Preparedness, Response and Recovery in Pakistan is another relevant initiative. It was a four-year programme, supported by DFID and implemented by a consortium led by IOM, with ACTED, UNICEF, FAO, and HANDS and ran till the summer of 2019. The multi-year funding was designed to enable the Consortium to act in a flexible, responsive and strategic manner to risks and needs as they are identified, as well as building systems and learning over the course of the programme. The consortium conducted Multi Sector Preparedness Trainings. One in Sindh, for example, in June 2018, was conducted in collaboration with the Sindh PDMA, and involved individuals from local government, local NGOs and social welfare departments from 5 districts.

The Start Network's 'Shifting the Power' project was another relevant effort, in which 12 Pakistani CSOs participated. The humanitarian capacity self-assessment and capacity strengthening plans were completed by each of the partner organisations using the 'Strategic Humanitarian Assessment and Participatory Empowerment' (SHAPE) framework. The second focus area of the project was around supporting local actors to be better represented and heard in their relevant platforms and networks. Partners from Pakistan worked across all but one of the competency areas. The largest areas of focus were Preparedness (12 partners), Resource Mobilization (9 partners) and Vision and Strategy (9 partners). Five partners shifted from manual accounting to software-based accounting systems while all partners started the process to apply for certification to the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy (PCP), a mandatory government certification to assess the quality and accountability of NGOs. Field staff received training in SPHERE and CHS (Common Humanitarian Standard and various other training on emergency preparedness and response such as on monitoring and evaluation, needs assessment, contingency planning, search and rescue and first aid). Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) were also formed in each of the partner organisations. All these organizations are now part of the NHN and actively contribute to emergency responses. Given the limited number of participating CSOs, however, the project did not have much impact on civil society at large.

In the survey, more than 60% of CSO respondents reported they had been involved in a capacity building effort in the past. Many of these had different focus, however, and only 35% reported they had received training for emergency response. The following diagram shows more clearly the various topics.



**Diagram 11.** Focus of the capacity building trainings CSO received



Concerning, however, is the doubt about the sustainable impact of these investments, because of the difficulty to retain capacities. Lack of and irregular access to funding, and loss of staff to international organisations and contractors who can offer better benefits, de facto lead to renewed reduction in organisational capacities. The trend among international donors to more restricted and short-term project funding will aggravate this situation.



Diagram 12. Perceived effectiveness of the capacity building initiatives

So, while international actors operate on the assumption that capacity-support is a fairly linear and cumulative process for a national or local organisation, in reality it is a fluctuation one, and reversals are well possible.

“The problem is the value chain. We spend time to build the capacities of our staff and then some national or international NGO pick them up for higher packages and position and we have to restart the whole capacity building program again. We don't value our staff so they can stay with us for long.”

(CSO participant)

International agencies also tend to see ‘capacity-strengthening’ as a one-way process, from them to national and local actors. If that were more the case in the past, realities today are changing. Increasingly, national and local agencies are also providing training and capacity support to each other and even to international agencies. Church World Service Asia, to give one example, provided training on Sphere Standards and the Common Humanitarian Standard to Help Age International and to the International Medical Corps.




Diagram 13. Key enabling conditions for Pakistani CSOs to respond fast and effectively to a rapid-onset crisis



Several of these are not created by ‘training’, which is still the most common form of ‘capacity-building’.

There are not many examples of middle-sized Pakistani NGOs which have successfully managed to come out of the capacity trap and are able to attract sufficient funding to continue their programs. Even well known organizations like Shirkat Gah and Aahung, which were once considered quite capacitated and sustainable, are now finding it difficult to attract sufficient funding to cover their core costs. The increasing donor demand for transparency and accountability has put many organizations under enormous financial and administrative pressure.

“Last year, we had four financial audits from different donors, projects and team heads. How much of our time was given to four independent audits although we do our own audit from a reputable organization yet still the pressure to be transparent is getting higher, and higher and so on.”

(Executive Director of Karachi based NGO)

While there are not many examples available from the humanitarian sector for strengthening the capacity of local actors and their institutional building, there are several from outside the humanitarian sector, from the last two to three decades in which comprehensive capacity building and institutional strengthening programs were carried out with excellent results.

The Development Planning and Management (DPM) programme by the Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO) was aimed at building the capacity of community-based organizations (CBOs) to plan, implement, manage, and monitor projects that responded to the development needs of their communities involving the equitable participation of all stakeholders. Through this program, 414 representatives of about 150 CBOs were trained by the SPO in all four provinces of Pakistan.

EU-RSPN Capacity Building of Local Grassroots Organisations in Governance, Transparency and Gender Sensitivity was being implemented in four regions by RSPN and three of its partner RSPs, namely, the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme in Chitral region, the National Rural Support Programme in Mardan and Turbat regions and the Sarhad Rural Support Programme in Mansehra region. 12-months’ programs were provided through which 130 LSOs and 30 CSOs in four regions in Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa were built in order to effectively manage their organisations and successfully develop linkages with partners such as the government, NGOs, donors and the private sector.

RDP is a training program conducted by the capacity building division of South Asia Partnership-Pakistan (SAP PK). This program was initiated in 1991 and builds the capacity of Community Based Organizations (CBOs) to plan and execute development projects and seeks to enable them to become viable and sustainable vehicles of social change. It also demonstrates to them how an integrated, self-reliant and participatory development of their respective communities is possible. The Program is conducted in two provinces each year. Thus, all the four provinces of the country are covered in a two-year cycle.

Certification Programs of the Pakistan Centre of Philanthropy awards accreditation to non-profit organisations that demonstrate excellence in three functional areas. So far, more than 1000 NGOs have been awarded that certificate. The certification programme seeks to bring transparency, accountability and good governance to the non-profit sector in Pakistan. It is the first initiative of its kind in South Asia and involves the evaluation of a non-profit organisation on standardized parameters of governance, financial management & programme delivery.



## 5.5 COORDINATION

Shortly before the massive 2005 earthquake, a Federal Relief Commission (FRC) had been established that became the focal point for governmental coordination. Once the acute response was over, the government created the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA). In March 2006, the FRC and ERRA merged. The performance of both entities was seen as effective, with open and collaborative coordination (Hoppe 2012).

Following the 2005 earthquake, Pakistan was the first country in the world where the cluster system was implemented, and was subsequently institutionalized, to be activated at a time of crisis. In its early years, it excluded Pakistani CSOs and “the local civil society regarded these clusters as the meeting of elite foreigners because they did not pay sufficient attention to the issues raised by local NGOs/CBOs” (Action Aid International no date:4).

By 2012, it was seen as still struggling to become efficient and effective, particularly at national level, and lacking in procedures, leadership and inclusive membership. Field level, operational, coordination meetings functioned somewhat better. Another major weakness at the time was the lack of learning from experience, with few recommendations taken up and implemented. Turnover of staff was one factor in this, but also the expansion-contraction of clusters in Pakistan, depending on whether there is an emergency or not. Equally, the reduction in attention when a crisis subsided, and little investment in preparing for the following one in between contributed to this (Hoppe 2012).

Difficulties for local/national NGOs in meaningful participation in cluster meetings, related to the investment of time and human/financial resources to attend so many meetings, and language barriers continue. Translation into Urdu is not always available, or even opportune, as there are other official languages in Pakistan, and Urdu is not the mother tongue of all Pakistani nationals. Local/national NGOs resort to attending more coordination meetings at provincial, district or sub-district level (Ibid).

By 2015, the cluster-system still remained widely perceived as essentially an UN-led process, dominated by the UN agencies with the mandate to coordinate certain clusters. Government participation was not substantive, and although there were 3 seats for INGOs and two for national CSOs, the latter continued to feel marginalised (Qazi 2015). Critiques focused on two aspects:

- the apparent attitude of UN agencies to see the HCT as a UN meeting rather than one of the whole ‘humanitarian community’ in the country;
- the general lack of willingness to engage the government more robustly on ‘impartial humanitarian action’. It functioned more as an internal coordination meeting, rather than – also – as a platform for engagement with external actors (Hoppe 2012).

**“Let me tell you an interesting thing, when you are invited for cluster meeting from UN, there is a table and a hall for meeting and there are 1 or 2 doors to corridors. The tables are taken over by the UN officials, there are chairs behind them for INGOS and the NGOS are given space in the corridors. That is how the system works, that’s what we should be trying to change, the system. Rather than saying that we should be getting 25% funds, once the attitude changes, things will change automatically so will the dollar amount.”**

(Country Head of a national NGO Network)

The 2018 Asia Disasters Preparedness Centre assessment finds overall a high level of awareness on roles and responsibilities, except for the private sector, academia, and the media.





It recommends the development of common standards on ‘coordination capacity’ and then short courses and training of trainers on humanitarian coordination, for governmental and non-governmental actors alike.

As for the presence and meaningful participation of local/national CSOs, “FGDs revealed that LNGOs do not have dedicated focal persons to attend coordination meetings. The participants expressed a need for authorizing representation at coordination meetings of selected LNGOs using a transparent selection process and ensuring the selection of a diverse range of national and local NGOs. There is also a need to determine criteria for participation in clusters.” (Summary of a discussion with Punjab NGOs/CBOs – FGD)

At the December 2018 workshop on localisation of protection, the Global Protection cluster, in collaboration with the International Rescue Committee, offered significant briefing about ‘localisation’, its rationale (as per the Grand Bargain), the global humanitarian architecture and its coordination system. There was also a participatory conversation about the attributes of a good coordinator, a reminder of the centrality of protection, and of the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) definition of protection. The Global Protection cluster developed a ‘Framework for Localisation in Coordination, after which participants identified good practices and gaps, at the time, in Pakistan (Global Protection Cluster 2018).

The cluster system has now been replaced by ‘working groups’. NDMA and PDMA are co-chairs of working groups.

“**The replacement of clusters with working groups reflects the fact that Pakistan is no longer considered a country with serious imminent threat of disasters and emergencies. This realization also led to the plans of scaling down of UNOCHA operations in the country. However, there were some reservations about the role of the clusters among the civil society representatives, who had reservations about the role of CSOs in clusters**”

(In-charge UN Agency)

Note that there are more networks in Pakistan that NGOs can be part of, e.g. the Human Resource Development Network (HRDN), Social Accountability Network (SAN), Scaling-Up Nutrition Civil Society Alliance Pakistan (SUN CSA), National DRR Forum, Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy (PCP), Global Network of Civil Society Organizations for Disaster Reduction (GNDR), Asian Disaster Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN), Start Network and the Gender Task Force (GTF). The perception about the coordination effectiveness of these national platforms is above average (Asian Disasters Preparedness Centre 2018b).

## 5.6 ISSUES OF GENDER IN DISASTER RESPONSE

Pakistan has a Gender Inequality Index value of 0.547, ranking it 136 out of 162 countries in the 2018 index.<sup>1</sup> The GDI measures gender inequalities in achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: health (measured by female and male life expectancy at birth), education (measured by female and male expected years of schooling for children and mean years for adults aged 25 years and older) and command over economic resources (measured by female and male estimated GNI per capita). The 2018 female HDI value for Pakistan is 0.464 in contrast with 0.622 for males, resulting in a GDI value of 0.747. Humanitarian crises can affect women, men, girls and boys in radically different ways, due to preexisting social,

<sup>1</sup> Human Development data from UNDP: [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr\\_theme/country-notes/PAK.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PAK.pdf)



cultural and political structures across the private and public spheres. In countries where women and girls are already at a disadvantage and vulnerable, disasters and emergencies can increase and worsen the plight of women and girls and increase their vulnerabilities. In such a context a gender sensitive humanitarian response is crucial to understanding and mitigating the worst effects of crises on different sections of the population. The National Plan Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2013, reflects on these aspects and notes that the “DRR requires the involvement of women as stakeholders to build resilient communities. Needs and damage as well as vulnerability and risk assessments, and DRR programs (such as Community Based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM), recovery, and reconstruction or sector-specific mitigation initiatives) need to demonstrate gender sensitivity” (Asian Disasters Preparedness Centre 2018b:9).

Different studies and researches have explored that impact of disasters and emergencies and their findings provide evidence of increased vulnerability and marginalization of women and girls during disasters and emergencies. Women in Pakistan have less access to food points and local markets compared with men even in normal times, with much more significant reductions in access than men during emergencies. In general, women have less access than men to livelihood resources such as land, employment and livestock and also lower levels of control over them. In emergencies, access to livelihood resources becomes more limited for both men and women. Threats, harassment, domestic disputes, community-level disputes and domestic violence are all aggravated during emergencies. Domestic violence is perpetrated largely against women, and its incidence increases during and after emergencies (Oxfam Pakistan 2017).

Keeping in view the increased vulnerabilities of women and girls during disasters and emergencies, almost all national and international organizations initiated and implemented projects which specifically focused on addressing the issues of gender in disaster and emergencies. Oxfam’s Institutionalising Gender in Emergencies (Batoool et al 2017) is a good example of such projects. The project focused on different aspects which included insufficient gender analysis and evidence to inform humanitarian response planning and practice, low technical capacity in gender in emergencies across sectors and organisations, lack of coordination on gender across different agencies to support sector programmes and lack of accountability for implementation of gender-related standards within organizations and across the humanitarian system.

The GBV sub-cluster has also been active in Pakistan and aims to address both immediate humanitarian service delivery needs and action to prevent and respond to GBV, and coordination with other development forums to address longer-term development of services, systems, and structures to protect the affected population from GBV.



## STRATEGIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO ADVANCING LOCALISATION IN PAKISTAN

The process of a collective and intentional ‘localisation’ in Pakistan, as a strategic objective to support the further development of strong, collective, governmental and non-governmental capacities to manage various types of crises, is still in an early phase. There is not yet a common understanding, in line with the purpose and intent of the Grand Bargain, and no clear strategic framework to direct various efforts towards a collective outcome. Worryingly, the research shows that the process has lost momentum, and that, at least for various Pakistani CSOs, the prospects are very challenging. This is the combined effect of different factors and trends, that have different sources, but aggravate the effect. These are the heightened security concerns which resulted in complex and time-consuming re-registration processes, and more time-consuming approvals required for programmes and projects, at least in some sensitive areas of the country (this also affected several INGOs), combined with donor trends to pass large financing envelopes through for-profit contractors or government funds, or to offer overly designed projects, mostly including only project costs in the budget, effectively putting the CSO in a sub-contractor position. Although several have access to other sources of funding, many have been highly dependent on international funding, and are struggling to adjust. Compliance and technical ‘capacity building’ in this context which does not consider the question of sustainable organisations that can attract and retain ‘capacities’, or the shrinking space in which Pakistani CSOs have to operate, are not likely to yield much sustained impact.

The individual interviews and group conversations with many interlocutors during this research yielded a number of practical recommendations, which can provide the outline of a roadmap for invigorating again the localisation process in Pakistan. These recommendations can be grouped under three headings:

### 1. Strengthening of NGOs and CSOs

- Simplification of the process of registration and obtaining of MoUs for the local organizations. Recent changes in the law have made the registration process very difficult and cumbersome. Similarly, the process of obtaining MoUs is not only very complicated but also long. These cumbersome processes are adding to the frustration in the sector and consequent loss of human resource. The process needs to be made easier. There is a need for strong joint advocacy both from local and international organizations for this.
- Greater organization and networking among CSOs working on disaster and emergency response.
- Strengthening of the financial management capacity of NGOs so that they are able to manage large grants.
- Strengthening of the organizational system of local NGOs to improve accountability and transparency.
- Redesigning of the power models within local NGOs; higher leadership focusing on preparing and developing people from management and middle management to take on the lead role. NHN can be used as a good approach in their core modality.
- Evidence based reporting from local organizations documenting what worked and what did not and what still needs to be improved. Strengthening of the capacity of the local NGOs in monitoring and analysis.



# 6

## 2. Greater Commitment from Donors and International Community

- Willingness in the donor community to explore practical ways of responsible and accountable risk sharing between local and international partners. This is also one of the major commitments of the Grand Bargain and if the donor community really wants to make efforts in more localised humanitarian response and action, it should be ready to share risk while working with local organisations.
- Greater advocacy efforts through proper platforms. Research based advocacy with examples of best practices and models which actually worked at local level.
- Increased dialogues and discussion with international donors/organisations involving governments for increased funding.
- Greater clarity about the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders.

## 3. Support and an enabling environment from the Government

- Greater support and acceptance from the government towards local actors especially civil society. Removing of legislative and administrative hurdles which make it difficult for civil society sector to engage more effectively in the disaster response.
- Greater collaboration between local organisations NDMA, PDMA's and DDMA's. Local organisations have a greater outreach in local communities and can help in improving the quality of response.



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Friedrich-Ebert-Straße 1  
53173 Bonn,  
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info@together-for-localisation.org  
www.together-for-localisation.org

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