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Towards **G**reater **E**ffectiveness and **T**imeliness in **H**umanitarian **E**mergency **R**esponse

REINFORCING AND SUPPORTING NATIONAL AND LOCAL ACTORS IN INDONESIA

WHERE ARE WE NOW?

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This publication is an edited and shortened version of the research report.

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WHERE ARE WE NOW?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research was commissioned by the ToGETHER Consortium of four German humanitarian NGOs (Caritas Germany, Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe and Malteser International). It is part of a series of eight country studies and a comparative analysis with other reports on Bangladesh, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Pakistan and Somalia. The analysis aims at informing the programme's efforts to advance localisation in these countries. Furthermore, it contributes to a wider translation into practice of the commitments that international agencies have made to support and reinforce rather than replace national and local crisis responders in their countries.

The report first explores the context, with particular attention to the role of the federal government and the legal-political space for civil society. It then maps what could be identified as important localisation-relevant initiatives and localisation conversations. Subsequently, more details are provided on the four dimensions of localisation which were investigated in particular – quality of relationship, finances, capacities, and coordination. Additionally, the cross-cutting issue of gender and localisation is discussed.

This research draws on a document review, online interviews with 44 individuals from 31 organisations (17 women and 27 men) and on an online feedback and validation group conversation on 11 August 2020 in which 22 organisations participated.

Its focus is natural disaster management in Indonesia. Further reflection will be required about appropriate roles for international and Indonesian actors in situations where humanitarian action results from larger-scale violence, and regarding refugees arriving in Indonesia.

Strong governmental localisation policy - INGO work only through national and local organisations

Localisation, in terms of the relationship between international agencies and national/local organisations in emergency response in Indonesia, has evolved as a national policy issue since the Indian Ocean tsunami response in late 2004. It gained more international attention particularly since the earthquake, tsunami, and liquefaction disaster in Central Sulawesi (September 2018), because the Indonesian government welcomed international agencies to deliver assistance, though only when working with national and local organisations. Though not a game changer for the Indonesian authorities, it appeared as such to a number of surprised international actors. It certainly triggered an increase in localisation-relevant articles and reports about Indonesia. Accordingly, this inquiry pays significant attention to the Central Sulawesi case and also explores the practice in the West Nusa Tenggara case. It aims to understand the current discussion and framework on localisation in Indonesia, including from the government policy perspective.

Extensive legal and policies framework promote Indonesian actors

For several years now, the Indonesian government has been elaborating its policies, but also strengthening its role and capacities to take on leadership and manage disasters. It does so in the framework of wider decentralisation. The government has developed an extensive legal and policies framework: de facto, this limits the role of international agencies and promotes that of Indonesian actors. Indonesia then is a case of strong governmental 'localisation' (or re-localisation after a dramatic internationalisation following the Indian Ocean tsunami). Practical problems remain, however, in terms of capacities and competencies of various local

authorities.

Decentralised disaster management in Indonesia

The Indonesia Disaster Management Master Plan mandates the local authorities as the first but also main responders in their respective areas. At local level, provincial authorities must establish their local disaster management agency (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah or BPBD). For district/municipal authorities, a BPBD is an option. While disaster management decision-making close to the problems is a positive move, there are also challenges. BPBD staff at local level face lack of budget and human resources. The practice of rotating public servants hampers the development and retention of a specialised cadre of officials.

Different ways of implementation of localisation on the non-governmental side

On the non-governmental side, local CSOs, national CSOs and international NGOs have different understandings of localisation in emergency response. Therefore, they implement it differently. The research identified several practices: In one case, the local CSOs work as distributors of international organisations' relief items. This is more of a sub-contracting relationship. In a second type of collaboration, the Indonesian organisation is an 'implementing partner' of a project or other type of intervention designed and directed by one or more international actors. It is not, however, a real 'decision-making' partner. A third modality is one in which the international organisation recruits more local and national staff (often pulling away the best people of Indonesian organisations). This is not in line with, even contrary to, the purpose and spirit of the Grand Bargain. A last, rare, modality is partnering on initiative of and around a proposal created by an Indonesian CSO.

Limited participation of affected communities and local CSOs in emergency response

The two cases of emergency responses in West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi allow a fuller understanding of the dimensions of localisation, especially from a local CSO's perspective. Participation of disaster affected communities in practice was not recognised to a significant extent. They were more recipients of humanitarian assistance than co-decision makers in what was being done on their behalf. In the beginning of the emergency response phase, only a very few local CSOs could partner with international agencies on delivering response. Only in the transition and recovery phases were more local CSOs able to work with international organisations. As far as capacities are concerned, many local CSOs were not humanitarian organisations at that time, so that they did not have all technical capacities for a comprehensive emergency response. In addition, not many international agencies provided capacity building activities during the emergency. Many of them preferred to work directly with CSOs that have sufficient capacities, including capacity in finance and administration. Some of these were larger, national Indonesian CSOs with or without significant prior presence in the crisis-affected areas.

Effective national coordination leadership supported by UN agencies and AHA-Centre

Many UN agencies, such as UNDP, FAO, IOM, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and UNHCR, have been involved in disaster risk reduction, disaster preparedness and emergency response, particularly since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. They coordinate with BNPB as national authority. In recent times, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA-Centre) is playing a more active supporting role to the Indonesian authorities, as was noticeable in the Central Sulawesi emergency in late 2018.

Local CSOs not sufficiently involved in cluster coordination meetings

On coordination, many local CSOs felt left behind. They were not sufficiently involved in the cluster coordination meetings. The meetings were dominated by national and international agencies. Many local CSOs which had limited capacity in emergency response felt that they were not recognized as main actors on delivering responses. Later on, in the transition and recovery phase, where many local CSOs worked as partners of international or national organisations, they were able to deliver assistance to communities. They were also recognized in the visibility of the project reporting and publication.

Current localisation discussion driven by INGO initiatives

With regard to influencing policies, localisation practice is still driven by an initiative from international NGOs directed to their national and local CSO partners. There is still no agreed framework to work together on implementing localisation. There is also still no discussion with provincial or national government in order to dedicate a specific policy on implementing localisation in emergency response.

No significant shift in international funding practices

Some Indonesian CSOs/movements receive direct funding from international donors. One example is Muhammadijyah Organisation, a large Indonesian CSO/movement that also provides relief assistance in other countries, which received further direct funding e.g. from Australian DFAT and USAID. During the Sulawesi response however, notwithstanding evident Indonesian leadership of the response, and a policy also favouring national and local Indonesian CSOs, no 'Sulawesi response pooled fund' was created. Thus, most international funding continued to go first through international organisations. In that sense, there was no shift towards more direct funding of national and local actors. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, this meant in many cases that funding was only granted for direct operating costs which included no management fee.

Nationally raised funding for national and local CSOs more readily available

During the Sulawesi response, some Indonesian CSOs opted out of partnering with international agencies, and limited or refused international funding, because of the excessive financial and administrative requirements. This was an option, as local, national and regional financial support was forthcoming, with less heavy bureaucracy attached to it (HAG and Pujiono Centre 2019). In addition, such nationally mobilised funding is more quickly available when international funding needs to go through a time-consuming proposal, negotiation and contracting process with institutional donors.

Good practices identified - network establishment, long-term capacity building, partnerships

The research also found good practices of localisation. Firstly, Oxfam facilitated Jaringan Mitra Kemanusiaan – JMK (humanitarian partnership network) consisting of many local NGOs from various locations in Indonesia. For 10 years now, Oxfam has facilitated capacity building for them, and then as a result, in Central Sulawesi response, JMK was fully in control of the response, from planning to reporting phases, including the management of human resources. Secondly, Cordaid also facilitated Emergency Response Capacity Building – ERCB network consisting of several NGOs as part of its exit strategy from Indonesia. Over several years, capacity building has been implemented, including practicing on joint protocol on emergency response. As a result, in Central Sulawesi, ERCB can now work directly with local CSO partners on implementing emergency response with limited assistance from Cordaid's staff. Both examples show the result of many years of investment into capacity building.

Furthermore, good examples of partnership during emergency response were found. For

example, Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund (ASB) encouraged different disabled people organisations in Central Sulawesi to establish a disability working group. The group was involved in the assessment, planning, and implementation of emergency response. They also participated in the coordination meetings with the government and provided input for a more inclusive response. Another example is that of UNFPA which, through facilitation from the local government, could partner with a local women's organisation in West Nusa Tenggara, called LPSDM. Through this collaboration, LPSDM was able to implement a gender responsive emergency response.

Many CSOs favour localisation as part of the national disaster response policies

Recommendations to deepen and advance localisation in crisis management were generated in a final feedback and validation online group call. Further work is required to achieve a common understanding of localisation, based on one or more frameworks, and a shared vision of what success would look like. That vision needs to be in line with the purpose and spirit of the Grand Bargain and, for signatory INGOs, their Charter 4 Change. That work must involve CSOs and INGOs, but also the UN (which is the first receiver of significant humanitarian funding) and the government. Many CSOs want to see localisation as part of the national (decentralised) disaster preparedness and response policies and systems. For this purpose, coordination and collaboration among actors needs to be improved, including building local leadership for emergency response. As better prepared communities who actively participate in what is decided and designed for their benefit, is a further goal of localisation, both CSOs and government agencies need to provide massive education to communities.

Localisation efforts should include preparedness, transition and recovery phases

Since Indonesia has a comprehensive approach to disaster management, localisation should not be for emergency response only, but also the preparedness, transition, and recovery phases. Regarding financial resources, Indonesia needs to better manage the nationally available finance sources from the public and private sectors that can be used by local actors for providing emergency response. Lastly, gender response and disability inclusion need fuller integration into the emergency response system, in order to be applied systematically.

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ACRONYMS

AHA CENTER	The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management
AIFDR	Australian-Indonesian Facility for Disaster Reduction
AIP-DRM	The Australia-Indonesia Partnership in Disaster Risk Management
ASB	Arbeiter Samariter Bund
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Australia DFAT	Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
BAKORNAS	Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (National Disaster Management Coordination Board)
BASARNAS	Badan Search and Rescue Nasional (National Agency on Search and Rescue)
BAZNAS	Badan Amil Zakat Nasional (National Agency for Islamic Zakat Fund)
BNPB	Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (National Disaster Management Agency)
BPBD	Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah (Local Disaster Management Agency)
C4C	Charter for Change
CBM	Christoffel Blindenmission
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
COVID	Corona Virus Diseases
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DIBI	Data Informasi Bencana Indonesia (Disaster Information Data of Indonesia)
DPO	Disabled People's Organization
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ERCB	Emergency Response Capacity Building
FAO	The Food and Agriculture Organization
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GMI	Global Mentoring Initiative
HAG	Humanitarian Advisory Group
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HFI	Humanitarian Forum Indonesia
HIS	Humanitarian Inclusion Standards for older people and people with disabilities
IDP	Internally-Displaced Person
IDR	Indonesia Rupiah
IMUNITAS	Perkumpulan Inovasi Komunistas (Association of Community Innovation)
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	The International Organization for Migration
JMK	Jejaring Mitra Kemanusiaan (Network on Humanitarian Partner)
KARINA	Caritas Indonesia

KONSEPSI	Konsorsium untuk Studi dan Pengembangan Partisipasi (Consortium for Study and Participation Development)
KPPA	Komunitas Peduli Perempuan dan Anak (Community Care for Women and Children)
LPBINU	Lembaga Penanggulangan Bencana dan Perubahan Iklim Nahdlatul Ulama (Nahdlatul Ulama Institution on Disaster Management and Climate Change)
LPSDM	Lembaga Pengembangan Sumber Daya Mitra (Institution of Partner Resource Development)
LPTP	Lembaga Pengembangan Teknologi Pedesaan (Institute of Rural Technology Development)
MDMC	Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affair
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPBI	Masyarakat Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia (Indonesia Society on Disaster Management)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (an Islamic Organization in Indonesia)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PEER	Preparing to Excel in Emergency Response
PKBI	Perkumpulan Keluarga Berencana Indonesia (Indonesia Association on Family Planning)
PKMK UGM	Pusat Kebijakan dan Manajemen Kesehatan Universitas Gajah Mada (Health Policy and Management Center of Gajah Mada University)
PKPU	Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat (Post for Society Justice)
PMI	Palang Merah Indonesia (Indonesia Red Cross)
PPDI	Perkumpulan Penyandang Disabilitas Indonesia (Association of People with Disabilities Indonesia)
ROA	Relawan untuk Orang dan Alam (Volunteer for People and Nature)
SC-DRR	Safer Communities through Disaster Risk Reduction programme
SEJAJAR	Sekretariat Jaringan-Antar-Jaringan (Secretariat of Network Across Networks) of civil society organization
SKPHAM	Solidaritas Korban Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia (Solidarity of Human Right Abuse Victims)
TATTS	Technical Assistance and Training Teams
ToGETHER	Towards Greater Effectiveness and Timeliness in Humanitarian Emergency Response
UN	United Nations
UNDP	The United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	The United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	The United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	The World Food Programme
WHO	The World Health Organization

WHS	The World Humanitarian Summit
YEU	YAKKUM Emergency Unit
YTBI	Yayasan Tanggul Bencana Indonesia (Indonesia Disaster Management Foundation)

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THE RESEARCH STUDY

1.1 PURPOSE AND KEY QUESTIONS

This research was commissioned by the ToGETHER Consortium of four German humanitarian NGOs (Caritas Germany, Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe and Malteser International). In addition to Indonesia, ToGETHER also runs in Bangladesh, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Pakistan and Somalia. The analysis aims at informing the programme's efforts to advance localisation in each country. Furthermore, it contributes to a wider translation into practice of the commitments that international agencies have made, to add support to and reinforce national and local actors that deal with crises in their countries.

The guiding questions for all countries were:

- Which understandings of localisation of humanitarian aid exist among humanitarian actors?
- Which localisation initiatives and programs took place or are taking place in the respective country? Which initiatives and programs provide good practice?
- Where are in-country actors making good progress and what are the most significant challenges in the key areas of the localisation process - namely partnerships, financing, capacity development, coordination and complementarity, and gender?
- What institutional, policy and political dynamics influence these developments?
- What are the most urgent strategic issues and challenges that need to be addressed to realise substantive, transformative change?

1.2 OPPORTUNITY AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES

The questions invite a broad canvas or system perspective on the state of localisation. This provides an opportunity as it takes the localisation conversation beyond the bilateral relationships of an international relief actor and its partner(s). It also considers contextual constraining and enabling factors. Most global research on localisation since the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit has tended to focus on one single aspect (e.g. funding, coordination, gender and localisation, risk management, governmental policy towards international operational presence) (Van Brabant 2020). There is, to GMI's knowledge, no significant precedent for a contextual system analysis.

The question where in-country actors are making good progress and where there are significant challenges is hard to answer when there are hundreds of multilaterals, bilateral, national and local governmental and non-governmental actors. All the more so if their multitude of institutional, policy and political dynamics is to be examined as well. Further, there can be significant contextual differences between sub-national contexts within a country. This is also true for Indonesia. Localisation was perceived and implemented somewhat differently in the two emergency cases investigated for this research, Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi.

1.3 INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORKS AND METHODS

A FRAMEWORK

The research looks at localisation as a multi-dimensional issue. In 2017, GMI developed the Seven Dimensions framework of localisation for the Start Network, which emerged from

extensive conversations with local and national actors in different countries (Van Brabant & Patel 2017). The framework has been tested and is used, sometimes with adaptations, by several other agencies, networks, or research groups.

RELATIONSHIP QUALITY	PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION	FUNDING & FINANCING	CAPACITY	COORDINATION MECHANISMS	POLICIES AND STANDARDS	VISIBILITY AND CREDIT SHARING
• respectful and equitable • reciprocal transparency and accountability	• deeper participation of at-risk & affected populations	• better quality • greater quantity	• sustainable organisations and collaborative capacities • stop undermining capacities	• national actors greater presence and influence	• national actors can contribute to and influence global and national policy and standards-development, and their application in their contexts	• roles, results and innovations by national actors are given credit and communicated about by international actors

Diagram 1. Seven Dimensions framework of localisation

The guiding questions for this and the other country assessments focused on four of the seven dimensions: quality of relationship, finance, capacity, coordination, and one cross-cutting issue: gender and localisation.

B METHODS

This report draws on a document review and interviews with key informants. The acquired information is analysed using the Seven Dimensions framework as described above.

Document review: The inquiry started with a literature review. 'Localisation' as a search word may yield some documents from after the World Humanitarian Summit and its Grand Bargain outcome document. But the dimensions of partnership, capacity support for national and local actors, and the latter's access to finance or meaningful participation in coordination structures, have a longer history. The same is true for the support for women's rights and women-focused national and local organisations. That can quickly lead to a substantive amount of literature, including older documents.

Key informant interviews: The research took place during the COVID-19 pandemic which resulted in mobility restrictions, especially in Jakarta. While this was not an obstacle for the literature review, it meant that individual interviews and collective conversations could only take place on-line. A total of 44 individuals (17 women and 27 men) coming from 31 organisations were interviewed. An online feedback and validation group conversation was held on 11 August 2020, in which 22 organisations participated. Under different circumstances, more conversations in West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi would have been organised, allowing greater participation of more local governmental and non-governmental actors, and affected communities.


UN ■
Government Policy Makers ■
INGOs working in Indonesia ■
National NGO affiliating with INGOS ■
National CSOs ■
Local CSOs ■

Diagram 2. Stakeholders interviewed

2 THE CONTEXT

Disasters happen in particular contexts, and so does the interaction between international and national/local responders. The vulnerability of a country to certain types of crises, the willingness and capacities of the national and local authorities to manage those, the prior experience of local and national actors, and the prior presence of international actors and how they relate to national and local ones are decisive factors for the speed and trajectory of localisation (GMI 2020b).

2.1 A DISASTER-PRONE COUNTRY

DIBI (Disaster Information Data in Indonesia) records all disaster events in the country. Data from 2011-2020 show that the most frequent ones are forest and land fires, tornado winds, drought, landslides and floods. Flooding is actually the most frequent disaster over the past 20 years (9053 events), followed by tornado winds (6318) and landslides (5130). In terms of impact, however, over the past 10 years, earthquake followed by tsunami has caused the highest casualties (3475 fatalities in one 2018 event alone), then flood (2241 fatalities) and landslides (1799 fatalities). Flooding also causes the highest number of injuries: 37,537 in the past 10 years. Earthquakes and tsunamis have had the biggest impact in terms of damaged houses, followed by floods and landslides.

2.2 GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

A ACTIVE GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP ON NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT

In Indonesia today, we see very active government leadership including the development of governmental institutional capacities, and an apparent intent to increase the collective national and local capacities to handle most disasters with Indonesian resources.

With National Law 24 (2007) on Disaster Management, the government established the National Agency for Disaster Management (BNPB). It is the successor to the National Coordination Agency for Natural Disaster and Refugees Relief (BAKORNAS) which had turned out to be insufficiently prepared to deal with the catastrophic Indian Ocean tsunami in late 2004, had no contingency plans and was then unable to provide operational capacity and coordination for national and international responses (Scheper 2006). These developments also need to be understood in light of the experience of a 'second tsunami' by the 'comprehensive response' of international relief agencies then, that also overwhelmed and displaced local and national capacities (Ibid). The term 'comprehensive response' was coined by Ramalingam and Mitchell in a paper for a donor meeting in 2014.

> *"Although Indonesia was forced to learn the hard way, the 2004 tsunami has led to a level of legal preparedness that sets a benchmark for the rest of South-East Asia and beyond."*
>
> **(IFRC 2015:81)**

Besides BNPB, some other government institutions have a mandate for disaster management. The National Agency on Search and Rescue (Badan SAR Nasional – BASARNAS) is one of them (National Law 29 from 2014). In addition, the Indonesia Red Cross Society (Palang

Merrah Indonesia or PMI) also has a mandate to conduct emergency response (National Law 1 from 2018). PMI manages volunteers, delivers training, disseminates information and provides health and social services in disaster situations. It works in close coordination with national and local authorities.

The BNPB manages an 'on call budget' that can be used for a disaster emergency. In 2020, the national government allocated IDR 5 trillion to it. This may still be increased given the COVID-19 pandemic.

B   DECENTRALISED DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Disaster management is decentralised. The Indonesia Disaster Management Master Plan mandates the local authorities as the first but also main responders in their respective areas (draft Plan 2015-2045). At local level, provincial authorities must establish their local disaster management agency (Badan Penanggulangan Bencana Daerah or BPBD) (see Willitts-King 2009). For district/municipal authorities, a BPBD is an option.[1]

National Law No. 24/2007 gives the mandate for implementing disaster management to local government, namely to guarantee the fulfilment of rights of disaster affected people according to minimum service standards, to protect people from disaster impact, to reduce disaster risk and its integration into development programmes, and to allocate sufficient budget for disaster management (article 8). In practice, the mandate is translated into local government specific duties through National Law number 23 of 2014 on Local Government.

Government Regulation no 2 from 2018 provides specification on Minimum Service Standards. Some standards delegated to local governments are basic need fulfilment and social protection (for province and district/municipality), health service (for province and district/municipality), house rehabilitation and provision (for province and district/municipality), and information distribution, prevention and preparedness, and rescue and evacuation (for district/city only). The technical guideline on implementing the standards is described in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) Regulation number 101 from 2018. The standards started to be implemented in 2020 through the 2020 local annual budget as mandated by MoHA Regulation number 33 from 2019. These regulations provide clear delegation and a planning and budgeting framework for local governments in this regard. Local authorities are expected to make a specific budget allocation called 'unexpected expenditure' which it can use for response, once it has declared a 'disaster emergency' status.[2]

By 2015, more than 90 per cent of districts/cities in the country had established BPBD (BNPB 2016). Note is to be taken that there is no structural command system from BNPB to BPBD. The local BPBD is responsible to the Head of Province/District/City.[3] During an emergency, the BPBD implements directions from the heads of local authorities, including the decision to declare a disaster emergency status or not. Only if a disaster status is declared by the national government, such as for the COVID-19 pandemic,[4] can BNPB as lead of a national Task Force directly provide directions to local governments.[5]

While such decentralised approach to disaster management (in line with the general decentralisation introduced in the 1998 political reforms) can be considered a positive move, to bring decision-making closer to where the problems occur, in practice it is not without its

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1   Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) Regulation number 46 from 2008 on Local Agency for Disaster Management.
2   For a detailed overview of the legal-administrative framework see Brown, Rovis et al 2017
3   For instance, in East Java Province, as stated in the Local Regulation of East Java Province number 2 year 2009 on Disaster Management Agency.
4   Presidential Decree number 12 year 2020 on Statement of Non-natural Disaster of COVID-19 as National Disaster.
5   Presidential Decree number 7 year 2020 that is updated by Decree number 9 year 2020 on National Task Force for Handling COVID-19.

challenges. Recent research indicates that BPBD staff at local level face lack of budget and human resources. Budget allocations at times only cover recurrent operating costs, with little extra for investment in disaster risk reduction or for community-level activities. Budget allocations sometimes also arrive late in the fiscal year, leading to unspent funds being returned to the Ministry of Finance. In addition, with decentralisation, the practice of rotating public servants means this now happens more between and within local administrative bodies. That leads to people with no DRR or crisis-response experience providing service at the BPBD, and then again rotating elsewhere. This hampers the development and retention of a specialised cadre of officials (Gita Srikandini et al. 2018). It is also a concern of international agencies that want to strengthen the disaster management capacities of local authorities. For INGOs, it may lead them to invest more in local CSOs, as there is greater staff continuity.

C   NATIONAL COORDINATION LEADERSHIP

To strengthen coordination, BNPB in 2014 issued Decree no 173. This led to the creation of a national cluster system with 8 clusters.

NO.	NATIONAL CLUSTER	LEADER
1	Health	Ministry of Health
2	Search and Rescue	National Agency on Search and Rescue (BASARNAS)
3	Logistic	BNPB
4	IDPs management and protection	Ministry of Social Affairs
5	Education	Ministry of Education
6	Facilities and equipment	Ministry of Public Work and Housing
7	Economy	Ministry of Agriculture
8	Early recovery	Ministry of Home Affairs

Table 1.   National Cluster on Emergency Response in Indonesia (Head of BNPB Decree No. 173/2014)

Many UN agencies, such as UNDP, FAO, IOM, UNFPA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and UNHCR, have been involved in disaster risk reduction, disaster preparedness and emergency response, particularly since the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. They can draw on the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and coordinate with BNPB as national authority. In recent times, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA-Centre) is playing a more active supporting role to the Indonesian authorities, as was noticeable in the Central Sulawesi emergency in late 2018. It also coordinates inter-governmental assistance between ASEAN members.

D   NON-GOVERNMENTAL   ACTORS   UNDER   GOVERNMENTAL LEADERSHIP

In 2016, BNPB, through regulation no 3 adjusted the Command System of Disaster Emergency Management. It is applicable to governmental and non-governmental actors, including international ones. It remains the active reference today and its implementation is one of the policies of the draft Disaster Management Master Plan 2015-2045. For international actors, it means their action is regulated and coordinated by the BNPB National Post.

BNPB Regulation no 11 from 2014 specifies the role of Indonesian CSOs in disaster management. Local organisations can distribute their relief via the emergency command post or directly to affected communities, but in the latter case only in close coordination with the post (art. 26). The emergency response command can also decide to include CSO representation in the command structure. What is not sufficiently clear for the current regulation (BNPB Regulation no. 3 of 2016 on the command system) is the role(s) CSOs may play in the local command systems. The regulation also does not refer to a possible scenario where CSOs would provide goods and services financed by the government budget.

The discretionary decision leads to different practices: during the 2018 West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi responses, many local CSOs were not involved in the coordination and implementation of the government-managed responses. That led some, such as the local authorities in Sigi District of Central Sulawesi, to now want to build stronger coordination and collaboration with CSOs in their renewed emergency plan (Head of Sig District Regulation no 3 of 2020 on emergency management plan).

E   PRIVATE SECTOR

Cooperation with private sector actors is part of the disaster management strategy (BNPB 2018). National Law No. 24/2007 states that business entities can implement disaster management, either doing it themselves or through cooperation with other actors (article 28). On conducting their activities, business entities must do so in line with the national policies on disaster management. They must follow national standards (article 29) and report their activities to the authorities, they must also report their activities to the national government and inform the public. Moreover, in implementing disaster management, they must follow national standards (article 29).

To better coordinate the many private sector actors, BNPB has created a Private Sector Forum which has many members. It proved a useful platform for coordination between private sector actors and between them and the government, in both the West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi disaster responses

F   SPACE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Indonesia has a diverse and vibrant civil society. The legal identity of most is as 'foundation' or 'association'. National Law number 16 from 2001 on Foundation that is updated by Law number 28 from 2004 allows foundations to collect money from society or to run businesses to fund their activities. Moreover, National Law number 17 from 2013 on Society Organization, updated by Law number 16 in 2017 also allows community associations to generate donations and implement activities on social services. While restrictions may be contemplated or imposed, e.g. the 'Family Resilience Bill' that would impact gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people (LGBTQ), one target group of HIV/AIDS programming, or under countering violent extremism regulations, overall there seems to be good space for civil society to play different roles.

3

INDONESIAN CSO PLATFORMS AND NETWORKS FOR DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Since the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004) and the Yogyakarta earthquake (2006), many more national and local CSOs started working on disaster management.

For coordinating national CSOs, the National Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) has been established since 28 April 2009. In fact, the platform not only consists of CSOs, but also representatives of government, private sector, mass media, and universities. At provincial level, there are already 25 DRR Forums,[6] and some other forums at district/city level are based on landscape area such as Mount Merapi Forum. Many local CSOs participate in the DRR Forums, including on coordination of emergency response, such as is the case, for example, in the Yogyakarta DRR Forum.

Besides the national platform and DRR Forum, there are some forums or CSO networks specifically on emergency response. Humanitarian Forum Indonesia (HFI) is a network of several national organizations, such as Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Center (MDMC), Yayasan Tanggul Bencana Indonesia (YTBI), YAKKUM Emergency Unit (YEU), Dompet Dhuafa, Karina KWI, Lembaga Penanggulangan Bencana dan Perubahan Iklim Nahdlatul Ulama (LPBINU) and some others. On several occasions, its members have conducted joint emergency needs assessments and then coordinated the responses implemented by each network member. In the Central Sulawesi emergency response, HFI managed to have joint assessments, funding and programming, situation reports, facilitated the donors to connect with members, and shared the works and funding among the members (Pujiono Centre 2019).

Another network is Jejaring Mitra Kemanusiaan (JMK), enabled by Oxfam. It consists of several local CSOs from various locations in Indonesia that are partners of Oxfam working on emergency response. Emergency Response Capacity Building (ERCB) is a third network focused on emergency response. It consists of several local CSOs such as Binaswadaya, Lembaga Pengembangan Teknologi Pedesaan (LPTP), Perdhaki, Yayasan Merah Putih, Pusaka Indonesia, Awam Green, Karsa Institute and others. They too responded to the earthquake-tsunami-liquefaction crisis in Central Sulawesi Province.[7] CORDAID has enabled this network for many years, and it could manage this most recent response with minimal further support.

Especially on COVID-19 response, there is a new network called Sekretariat Jaringan-Antar-Jaringan civil society organizations (SEJAJAR) that is facilitated by Pujiono Centre, Oxfam, and MDMC. Since COVID-19 affects almost all areas in Indonesia, the SEJAJAR network has grown by involving many local CSOs responding to COVID-19 at national and local levels. It also provides technical capacity building for local CSOs. SEJAJAR has contributed to an integrated ('nexus') type of approach, by involving CSOs working on peace building and development into COVID-19 response (Pujiono et al. 2020). It also shifts the power by improving local actors' capacities, hence they can negotiate with international actors. Furthermore, the network is also replicated at provincial level which creates more opportunities for local CSOs to engage with local governments on the COVID-19 response (Pujiono et al. 2020).

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6   This is the updated information from BNPB. https://bnpb.go.id/berita/forum-prb-media-koordinasi-dan-penguatan-kapasitas-penanggulangan-bencana Accessed on 30 June 2020.
7   http://klikterus.com/2018/11/emergency-response-capability-building-ercb-upaya-bersama-memulihkan-palu-sigi-dan-donggala/ Accessed on 30 June 2020.

LOCALISATION CONVERSATIONS AND INITIATIVES

4.1   POST-SULAWESI – A 'NEW NORMAL'?

Localisation practices, in which international NGOs work closely with local CSOs for emergency responses, pre-date the World Humanitarian Summit and Grand Bargain. One example was the Merapi volcano eruption in 2010 (Vitriyana 2011). For the disaster in West Nusa Tenggara, the government did not call for more international assistance, but left space for international agencies already working in Indonesia to respond in collaboration with local and national actors. Several reduced their engagement quite quickly, to shift attention and resources to Central Sulawesi.

The governmental policy following the earthquake-tsunami-liquefaction disaster in Central Sulawesi in September 2018 surprised several international actors and signalled the existence of what some have called a 'new norm', at least in parts of Asia (Jirauni Osborne et al. 2019). Indeed, the Government of Indonesia announced that all international assistance must be channelled via national or local partners and restricted the numbers and roles of international relief actors on the ground. Both UN and INGOs had to adapt (Summary Note 2019). Many INGOs did. INGOs without prior presence and established partnerships in Indonesia struggled to find a role, and sometimes contributed, indirectly, under the umbrella of a partner of their international alliance.

> *"The Sulawesi humanitarian response was an important step for national actors in the Asia-Pacific region; they took control of the response, regardless of whether international actors were ready to let go. The timeline for the power shift is no longer being set by the international system in this region. (...) the decisions on when and how localisation will take place are being taken out of the hands of international actors."*
>
> **(Jirauni Osborne et al. 2019:14/17)**

The national policy to limit international actors' direct interventions and to request them to partner with local organisations for the Sulawesi response was supported by local, national, and international organizations (Robillard et al. 2020).

Research undertaken by the Indonesian Pujiono Centre, with support from the Humanitarian Advisory Group, and commissioned by the Dutch Relief Alliance, indicates broad perceptions that it did not negatively impact the timeliness or the quality of the response (HAG & Pujiono Centre 2019b).

The government policy regarding the Sulawesi response accelerated the localisation conversation in Indonesia and also drew attention more globally. Much of the recent literature on localisation in Indonesia relates to this disaster and its response.

Policy and practice conversations are now taking place in different spaces, governmental and non-governmental. Once the Sulawesi response stabilised and in anticipation of the Grand Bargain Workstream on Localisation regional conference, several meetings on localisation took place in a short time (5, 10, 15 and 26 August 2019, Summary Note 2019). At the inter-agency roundtable on localisation of aid conducted on 15 August 2019, local CSOs, national organisations and international actors agreed that localisation should not merely be channelling funding to local CSOs. It should also address improving capacities to rapidly and effectively scale up or 'surge' in response to a sudden-onset disaster. Local organisations must also be better included in the clusters. And better relationships developed between national NGOs and local CSOs and network amongst local CSOs.

It is perhaps no coincidence that the Grand Bargain Workstream on Localisation's Asia and Pacific regional conference on localisation of aid took place in Indonesia (27-28 August 2019). One of the special events at that conference concerned 'localisation in the Central Sulawesi humanitarian response'. Moderated by the director of the Pujiono Centre, its speakers from Indonesian CSOs and INGOs all shared their experiences (Summary Note 2019).

Noteworthy is, however, that localisation is not discussed in terms of the Grand Bargain commitments in government circles, including in the BNPB. The dominant framework and reference for government actors remains the National Action Plan on Disaster Management 2020-2024 with its core objective of strengthening local governmental and other actors.

4.2   NO COMMON UNDERSTANDING

Notwithstanding the clear strategic direction, there is a variety of understandings of 'localisation' among the many stakeholders.

The research finds that many local CSOs see it as the effort to more closely involve communities and ensuring that the response meets their needs, and does so with consideration of their local social, economic and cultural context. A component of that is to also involve local resources and local people in the response. At another level, the interviews show that 'localisation' is also understood as leaving the leadership to the 'local' governmental and non-governmental actors, and not having it taken over by national or international actors. The key issue here is roles, responsibilities, capacities and leadership between different actors, operating in a specific context. International and national actors are invited to support and reinforce local actors instead of replacing them and taking over their roles and leadership. However, there is a widely shared agreement that the objective is effectively meeting the needs of affected people, and that international agencies should not be working directly at local/community level. The diagram visualises this.

3. Can be supported by national and international organisations	2. Implemented by local actors (government and non-government), and coordinated by local government	
LOCALISATION →		**Emergency response meeting disaster affected people's needs effectively**
4. Require policy and coordination from BNPB (national agency for disaster management)	1. Require community participation in decision making	

Diagram 3.   Trend of Understanding on Localisation

The diagram shows that localisation is actually a means to the objective of achieving an emergency response that meets disaster-affected people's needs effectively. For this reason, localisation requires community participation in making decisions related to what kind of relief should be provided and how to distribute it to all affected communities. In the Indonesia context, the response should be implemented by local actors comprising both government and non-government agencies. The implementation of the response should also be coordinated by local government. Local actors in this case will depend on the status of emergency.

If the status is at district/municipality level, the main actors should be from the district/municipality, while provincial and national actors play more of a supporting role. If the status is at provincial level, the main actors and the coordinator should come from the province. District/municipality actors will implement in their respective area, while national actors will provide support. Implementation of localisation in emergency response can be supported by national and international organisations. For implementing this localisation approach, policy and coordination from the national agency (BNPB) are needed, because it has authority to manage emergency, including on providing funding, mobilizing national resources, and recommending on whether to call for international assistance or not.

An issue of 'nationalised' offices, branches or affiliates of INGOs or INGO federations/alliances remains. 'Nationalised' here means their registration as Indonesian CSOs. While in the short run, these are not seen as problematic, from a localisation perspective tensions arise when they start using their stronger international connections to draw funding to themselves, including under the Grand Bargain commitment to channel more funding to local and national responders. The trend can become particularly controversial when they also use the fundraising expertise of their international partners and compete for domestic funds against local and national CSOs lacking such international affiliations. Globally, a serious number of purely national and local CSOs are challenging this practice (Pujiono Centre 2019).

4.3 DEFINITIONS OR FRAMEWORKS?

The research and its verification and validation conversation on 11 August 2020 confirm that there is currently no clear or widely known framework for understanding and structuring the reflections, conversations and planning around 'localisation' either.

4.4 NATURE AND QUALITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP

The research conversations with different actors about the emergency responses in West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi revealed different types of collaboration.

- Local CSO works as distributor of the relief items of the international organisation. Even if based on the assessment by the local CSO, the latter has little to no ability to design and decide other interventions.

- International organisation has a programme design and partners with a national or local CSO to implement it. Where there is a good relationship, the Indonesian actor can still discuss the programme design with the international actor, to adjust it better to local conditions. If the key partner is a national CSO, it may use its network in the disaster context to build collaborations with local CSOs.

- Local and international actors divide lead responsibilities among themselves for a multi-facetted response. For example, there are 5 action areas, the international organisation leads on two and one or more Indonesian actors on the other three. This can be a form of complementarity and requires close coordination between the collaborating entities.

- International organisations or their Indonesian member of an international alliance scale up by recruiting Indonesian staff nationally and locally. That was (partially) the case, for example, for Save the Children Indonesia for the Sulawesi response.

- National/local CSOs develop a proposal and seek funding and other support from international agencies and donors, while maintaining leadership and ownership. This is becoming quite common where there are long-standing collaborations and prior experi-

ences of collaborative emergency response. Some Indonesian CSOs now have an existing framework agreement, such as ERCB with CORDAID and JMK with Oxfam.

The modalities are influenced not just by past presence of the international organisation, but more by how it has seen and developed its role in Indonesia, particularly in its relationship to Indonesian actors. The most effective collaboration occurred where there were longer-standing strategic partnerships, collective capacity-development in-between emergencies, and framework agreements for emergency response. This enables Indonesian CSOs to be 'decision-making' and not just 'implementing' partners. For local CSOs, the research shows this to be the best approach to practice 'localisation'.

The Sulawesi response showed the drawbacks of the absence of established partnerships. Some international agencies hurriedly looked for collaborative arrangements, which more often than not did not work well. One well-established national NGO was quickly approached by 15 international organisations seeking to partner, while mobilising its own response (Summary note 2019). Also others were overwhelmed by the 'surge in partnering requests' from international actors, some of them with only an offer of a short-term, emergency response project (HAG & Pujiono Centre 2019b).

From the perspective of some local CSOs, this again felt like an instrumental, sub-contracting relationship (Summary note 2019). Local CSOs in Central Sulawesi testify that the process of building partnership with international or national institutions took complex and lengthy assessments with many questions to be answered. The partnership was mostly on the implementation of short-term projects for the distribution and delivery of services to affected communities. In this case, many local CSOs felt that they were more like workers dealing with employers (Ibid). For quick response despite limited local capacities CARE, for example, prioritised partners with established national operational capacity and focused on distributions, rather than working directly with local CSOs (Palmer et al. 2020).

Multiple international organisations working with the same local or national actors also need to align in a configuration that leaves the local actors equal influence. This is still not common practice, as a result of which a local/national actor, already heavily absorbed in action, needs to deal with fragmented and non-aligned requests, requirements and 'capacity support' offers/ engagements from its multiple international partners. Grand Bargain commitment 9 calls explicitly for international actors to '*harmonise and simplify reporting requirements*'.

> *"Kami mengalami proses "peminangan" melalui pengkajian yang rumit, panjang, dan melibatkan pertanyaan dan persyaratan kelengkapan informasi yang berulang-ulang yang melelahkan. Kebanyakan dari proses itu seperti "browsing" yang sejatinya tidak berakhir dengan kemitraan."*
>
> *Translation: "We experienced the process of "courting" through complex and lengthy assessments that involved exhausting questioning and thorough information requirements. The process was similar to "browsing" and it did not usually conclude with actual partnership."*
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> (Position paper of local CSOs in Central Sulawesi Province. Presented at the Asia-Pacific Regional Conference on Localization of Humanitarian Assistance in Jakarta, 27/28 August 2019)

4.5   PARTICIPATION REVOLUTION

As mentioned, the COVID-19 situation made it impossible to directly engage with communities in disaster-affected regions. The documents reviewed do not provide real insight in the quality and inclusiveness of participation of crisis-affected people in Indonesia, in what is being done for their benefit. From global experience, we know that this is often implemented

by them being consulted during needs assessments and certain mechanisms to provide feedback and voice complaints. The latter can be fragmented between different agencies and projects. In addition, perception and satisfaction surveys can be conducted, sometimes by a third party. Approaches in which affected people get fully involved in the choice and design of a certain action for their benefit, and actually have control over at least part of the budget (along the lines of 'participatory budgeting') exist but remain highly exceptional. Humanitarian evaluation questions focus more on '*were/are needs met*', than '*was/is people's agency enabled*' (see e.g. Anderson et al. 2012 and OECD 2019).

The impression is that there is quite a strong tradition of community-based approaches in Indonesia. How these practices align, or not, with international relief sector practices around consultation and feedback and complaints mechanisms (which are not that empowering) is not addressed in the documents reviewed here. It is a question worth exploring more deeply.

What the documents consulted do signal is that the participation and leadership of women in the Sulawesi response was not what it could and should have been (YAPPIKA-ActionAid 2019).

4.6   ACCESS TO QUANTITY AND QUALITY FUNDING[8]

Some Indonesian CSOs/movements receive direct funding from international donors. One example is Muhammadijyah Organisation, a large Indonesian CSO/movement that also provides relief assistance in other countries, which received further direct funding e.g. from Australian DFAT and USAID (No author 2017 and Summary note 2019). During the Sulawesi response however, notwithstanding evident Indonesian leadership of the response, and a policy also favouring national and local Indonesian CSOs, most international funding continued to go first through international organisations. In that sense, there was no shift toward more direct funding of national and local actors (HAG & Pujiono Centre 2019a; 2019b).

Several international agencies also mobilised and offered funding for the immediate emergency response, but not for the subsequent recovery (with ambiguity between the government's formal declaration of an end of 'emergency' and start of 'recovery', and realities on the ground). That sometimes led to situations where they no longer could provide assistance for ongoing immediate, basic, needs.

Common concerns, especially for international actors, also occur in Indonesia, or are at least pointed out in the Sulawesi-related documents: the 'absorption' capacity of larger funds notably among local and national actors (HAG & Pujiono Centre 2019b). 'Absorption' capacity is possibly a misnomer for 'spending capacity'. This issue in general merits more inquiry and critical reflection, as it tends to merge four factors which are not identical: 1. the speed and scale with which crisis-affected people can be provided with basic services, food and non-food items and protection; 2. the organisational capacity to do so; 3. the contextual factors that enable or constrain such (e.g. inaccessible terrain, shortage of essential supplies); and 4. the bureaucratic 'pressure to spend', which has no automatic correlation with the first three.

No 'Sulawesi response pooled fund' was created, which is a mechanism that potentially can ensure better funding allocations across multiple actors in complementary roles with one process and set of requirements. To a degree, the different existing CSO platforms, networks

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8 Critical for any organisation, including Indonesian ones, is not only the quantity but the quality of finance. This relates in the first place to being able to cover core costs and not only direct project costs, regularity of cash flow, a degree of predictability of finance, and flexible fund to cover cash flow fluctuations and to invest in organisational development. (GMI 2019)

and consortia did fulfil some of those functions (ibid).

More problematically, there were still instances where international agencies funded only direct operating costs, and did not share their management fee, or otherwise cover core costs for the Indonesian organisation (Summary note 2019). Of note is also that some Indonesian CSOs opted out of partnering with international agencies, and limited or refused international funding, because of the excessive financial and administrative requirements. This was an option, as local, national and regional financial support was forthcoming, with less heavy bureaucracy attached to it (HAG & Pujiono Centre 2019a). In addition, such nationally mobilised funding is more quickly available when international funding has to go through a time-consuming proposal, negotiation and contracting process with institutional donors. Non-registered funding for emergency responses, globally, is significant and may outweigh registered and tracked funding. One possible area for engagement is for Islamic funding sources to consider the principles of 'Good Humanitarian Donorship' (HAG & Pujiono 2019b) – or to develop their own.

Noteworthy here is that Indonesia now has a Philanthropy Association, with many members. In the case of a disaster emergency event, they often organize fundraising and implement emergency response directly to the affected areas or in collaboration with other actors. The members also include religion-based charity organisations which collect funds from citizens. Badan Amil Zakat Nasional (BAZNAS) for instance, allocates some of the zakat fund (Islamic mandatory charity fund) for providing food during emergency response and reconstruction of damaged houses for communities.[9]

For the West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi response, several Indonesian not-for-profit and private sector organisations were able to mobilise significant amounts. Examples are MDMC and NU Peduli, and the Media Corporation through its Media Group Foundation. This happens on an individual organisational basis and is not brought together in what could be an Indonesian constituted 'pooled fund'.

4.7 CAPACITIES

There is a long and nuanced history of disaster-related capacity support and capacity sharing between international agencies and Indonesian government institutions and civil society organisations.

One capacity strengthening resource is the BNPB. In 2019, BNPB reported that on targeting to 136 districts/cities as stated in the Mid-Term Development Plan 2015-2019, 35,21% of the districts/cities have integrated disaster risk assessment into local development plans. BNPB also facilitated 28 districts/cities in developing contingency plans in 2019. Community capacity to deal with disaster risk increased from 8% in 2018 to 9.65% in 2019. The recovery process index after a disaster event also increased from 3.47% in 2018 to 4.85% in 2019 (BNPB 2019). Those achievements show significant national and local capacity on disaster management.

Besides interventions implemented by BNPB, strengthening national and local capacity on disaster management is also supported by various organizations or programs. From 2007 to 2013, UNDP initiated the Safer Communities through Disaster Risk Reduction in Development (SC-DRR) project to assist national government and some local governments in Indonesia.[10] The Australian government also supports Indonesia by strengthening national and

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9   https://www.bappenas.go.id/id/berita-dan-siaran-pers/menteri-bambang-brodjonegoro-dorong-pemanfaatan-dana-zakat-untuk-capai-sdgs/. Accessed on 7 August 2020.

10 https://www.id.undp.org/content/indonesia/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/safer-communities-through-disaster-risk-reduction-in-development.html . Accessed on 7 August 2020.

local governments through the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR implemented from 2009 to 2013 and extended until 2015.[11] Following that, from 2019 to 2024 the Australian government also supports BNPB through The Australia-Indonesia Partnership in Disaster Risk Management (AIP-DRM) program.[12] Besides those, the United States of America also have a DRR program in Indonesia called "Institutionalizing Disaster Preparedness and Management Capacity of Provincial Disaster Management Agencies (BPBDs) in Indonesia through Technical Assistance and Training Teams (TATTs)" that was implemented from 2014 to 2019.[13]

Indonesia has also been one of the countries where a country-level consortium of INGOs (CRS, World Vision, Oxfam, Save the Children, Mercy Corps and CARE) implemented the Emergency Capacity Building Project. It is also clear that governmental capacities, while still unevenly spread, are stronger than a decade ago, as are those of several national Indonesian CSOs, which have their own dedicated units or centres. There is also a growing network of Indonesian experts in various technical fields, but also for training, research, evaluation etc. All of this begins to add up to a growing collective 'disaster management infrastructure' in the country. An obvious strategic objective, in line with continued localisation, would be to further reinforce this. That requires international agencies to look beyond the bilateral relations with Indonesian partners and 'the project'. A 'disaster risk reduction' framework is enabling for such an approach.

An important 'capacity' in Indonesia, not only for the Indonesian Red Cross, are volunteers, who are mobilised in significant numbers and many of whom bring professional experience and -expertise. The documents do acknowledge the complexities around getting help from 'volunteers': the logistical arrangements and cost of moving them back and forth to the crisis area, their possibly limited prior exposure to emergency response and the policies and procedures of the organisation that hosts them, and turnover as a percentage of them can only dedicate a limited amount of time. Volunteers, additionally trained for and during an emergency response, may constitute a 'capacity' an Indonesian CSO can draw on in future.

The government's policy around the Sulawesi response prevented an international surge which is often at the expense of local and national CSOs, as their best people get hired away in droves. Still, the documents reviewed signal that several local CSOs in Central Sulawesi were struggling as they did not have the emergency response experience, and the systems in place to rapidly scale up (while maintaining quality) or absorb significantly larger amounts of funding. Some of them also had staff who themselves were 'disaster-affected' (HAG &

> *"Kami tidak menemukan upaya yang terkoordinasi dan memadai dari pelaku internasional untuk menolong mengatasi kesenjangan ini (kapasitas) dan meningkatkan kemampuan kami pada skala, kecepatan dan kualitas yang mumpuni untuk menjadi asset penanganan kedaruratan kemanusiaan. Terkait hal itu, OMS-OMS lokal hanya mendapatkan penguatan kapasitas seadanya sesuai dengan tugas proyek yang khusus dan sempit yang diberikan kepada kami".*
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> *Translation: "We did not find adequate and coordinated efforts from international actors to help overcome this gap and to improve our ability on the scale, speed and quality to be an asset in responding to humanitarian emergencies. Related to this, local CSOs only receive modest capacity strengthening in accordance with the specific and narrow project assignments given to us".*
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> **(Position paper of local CSOs in Central Sulawesi Province. Presented at the Asia-Pacific Regional Conference on Localization of Humanitarian Assistance in Jakarta, 27/28 August 2019)**

11 https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/aifdr-ipr-ipm.pdf. And https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/aus-indonesia-facility-disaster-reduction-completion-review.pdf. Accessed on 7 August 2020.

12 https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/business-opportunities/Pages/australia-indonesia-partnership-in-disaster-risk-management-aip-drm-design. Accessed on 8 August 2020.

13 https://mercycorps.or.id/sites/default/files/dokumen/Program%20Profile%20TATTs%20Mar-2019%20English.pdf. Accessed on 8 August 2020.

Pujiono Centre 2019b). Not surprisingly, they felt that capacity building provided by international actors during this particular emergency response was not sufficient to significantly strengthen the quality and effectiveness of their emergency response, recovery and follow-up. That also applied to the Indonesian Red Cross, where of course not all provincial and branch levels have extensive experience with emergency responses yet.

As stated by local CSOs in Central Sulawesi, insufficient capacity of the CSOs leads to them being excluded from direct partnership with international actors, since the actors apply many requirements that can only be fulfilled by well-established CSOs. Capacity building activities were mostly on skills related to specific project assignments.[14]

One example of INGO capacity support which also sought to promote greater inclusion comes from the Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Office for Indonesia and the Philippines (ASB). ASB established a working group for the Sulawesi Response consisting of representatives from disabled people's organizations (DPOs) to ensure their meaningful involvement in inclusive humanitarian response operations. ASB quickly built the DPO's capacity through training, mentoring and coaching on humanitarian quality standards, including the Core Humanitarian Standard, Sphere and Humanitarian Inclusion Standards (HIS) as well as key humanitarian sectors, such as WASH (ASB 2019).

Interestingly, national NGOs also played an important role in providing support and capacity building to local NGOs based in Sulawesi. National NGOs acted at times as intermediaries to administratively manage the emergency response projects and meeting the requirements of international donors. They worked with many local CSOs in delivering the response activities and assistance to affected people (HAG & Pujiono Centre 2019a). This is particularly interesting because in various countries local CSOs note that they get replaced or turned into sub-contractors, not only by international agencies, but also by 'national' ones. Some of that may have occurred also in the Sulawesi response. INGOs also often took on the responsibility (and the heavy work) of dealing with the aid bureaucracy that comes with international funding, leaving more freedom for Indonesian actors to focus on the actual response.

As elsewhere, 'capacity development' must integrate technical competencies with organisational capacities, the ability to attract and retain competent people, to sustain sophisticated procedures and to invest in time-saving technologies. Disconnections of these three elements lead to limited and at times only short-term impacts of capacity reinforcements (HAG & Pujiono Centre 2019a).

The strategic way forward seems to be longer-term partnerships, preferably with consortia or networks than via a multitude of bilateral arrangements, supported by multi-year funding, and within which further emergency response and recovery capacity development is included.

The relevant literature on Indonesia focuses exclusively on natural disaster management, and this inquiry did as well. Generally neglected are the capacities of Indonesian actors to deal with conflict-driven crises, leading e.g. to forced displacement, or with refugees (Rohingya refugees also arrive in Indonesia).

4.8   COORDINATION

In the emergency response implementation, both at West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi provinces, the responses were led by the command teams established by national and provincial governments including police and military institutions at province level. The

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14 Organisasi Masyarakat Sipil (2019) Position paper. Local civil society organizations on localization of aid in response to the earthquake in Central Sulawesi in 2018-2019. Palu: OMS

command team plays a central role in coordinating and implementing all response activities. At technical level, national clusters were activated in both responses, and those were mostly led by the national ministry in charge supported by UN agencies or international organizations. The Government of Indonesia led the coordination, supported by the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Disaster Assistance (AHA Center) and OCHA. Other UN agencies and sometimes Indonesian or international NGOs provided further technical support. Bahasa Indonesia was a core language of the coordination communications. This is a positive feature compared to many other situations in the world where English dominates, creating a language barrier for several local and national actors.

While the national leadership is a positive expression of localisation, the practical experience showed that the coordination around the Sulawesi response faced some challenges: The interaction between national and local levels was not always as smooth as required, the role of the AHA Centre was not clear to many for whom this was a new actor, and the nationally led coordination remained somewhat disconnected from the Humanitarian Country Team – or the HCT from the national coordination mechanisms (Ibid). Several local CSOs originally from the province expressed that they were not sufficiently involved in the cluster coordination meetings, since those were dominated by national and international actors. During the first month of response, only a few local CSOs participated in the coordination meetings.

Particularly local CSOs in Central Sulawesi were not, however, familiar with cluster system coordination. For this reason, they turned to using a Whatsapp group which made it easier for them to coordinate with other actors. In addition, they also felt that coordination mechanisms did not pay serious attention to involve local CSOs and affected communities in decision-making and strategic development for emergency response (Ibid). Although all clusters were led by national or local government representatives and the coordination was conducted in Indonesian language (HAG & Pujiono Centre 2019a), it seems that local CSOs did not have sufficient room to express their aspirations in the coordination meetings. Some though, like the Disabled People's Organisations, were supported by the international INGO partner to attend.

> *"Pertemuan-pertemuan Klaster berlangsung seperti kontes, masing-masing peserta memamerkan lembaganya dan apa sudah dilakukan, dan lebih panjang lagi tentang apa yang akan mereka lakukan secara normatif. Tetapi sangat sedikit yang berbicara secara nyata, stratejik, dan kuantitatif serta berjangka waktu tentang pemenuhan hak dasar masyarakat terdampak dan terutama pemberdayaan kelompok rentan."*
>
> *Translation: "Cluster meetings appeared like contests where each participant showed off their institutions and what they had done, and even more about what they would normatively do. But very few spoke in real, strategic and quantitative and time bound terms, about the fulfilment of the basic rights of the affected communities and especially the empowerment of vulnerable groups."*
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> **(Organisasi Masyarakat Sipil (2019) Position paper. Local civil society organizations on localization of aid in response to the earthquake in Central Sulawesi in 2018-2019. Palu: OMS)**

An issue typically overlooked in the discussions about coordination and localisation is the coordination capacities within CSO networks and consortia. The Humanitarian Forum Indonesia, which brings together 14 faith-based organisations, signalled that its secretariat was and largely remained understaffed to support internal coordination, and did not receive external assistance for its efforts (Summary note 2019). An overarching 'network of networks' or national coordination platform for all Indonesian CSOs is still missing (HAG & Pujiono Centre 2019b).[15]

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15 Some inspiration could be drawn from the National Humanitarian Network in Pakistan, of Pakistani CSOs, which have created a structure to province and district level that mirrors that of the National, Provincial and District Disaster Management authorities.

5   CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

Specific research work was done to analyse cross-cutting issues that tend to influence the collaboration between national/local and international relief actors, notably different accountabilities to different stakeholders, operational respect for humanitarian principles, and gender. The research could not offer specific insights on the first two (other than the points mentioned under the 'participation revolution') but does raise the issue of gender and localisation.

The Grand Bargain has been criticised for not being sufficiently gendered. At a meeting in September 2016, a few months after the World Humanitarian Summit, an informal *Friends of Gender group* for the Grand Bargain was formed. Several organisations, among them UN Women and ActionAid, are part of it. Its purpose is to advocate for stronger integration of gender equity and women's empowerment in all work streams of the Grand Bargain. It also states the case that localisation cannot be effective without successful engagement with and investment in women and women's organisations, given the actual roles they play in responses (YAPPIKA-ActionAid 2019b). It is worth quoting ActionAid's understanding of women-led localisation. The research found several Indonesian CSOs acknowledging that the responses in both West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi were not strongly gender responsive or accommodating disability inclusion. There are many cases of violence against women and child marriage found during emergency response and recovery phase in both areas. Many relief and temporary shelter provisions have not taken into account the specific needs of women, children, and persons with disabilities.[16] Many women and children considered that temporary shelters are not safe for them if they had to stay together with men.[17] Involvement of international agencies did not necessarily avoid this.

More gender responsive emergency action can be found in areas where gender sensitive organisations (local, national, or international organizations) work. However, those are only limited to a few areas compared to very large disaster affected areas in both West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi.[18]

> *"Women-led localisation is a process progressively connecting national women's networks and grassroots women's organisations, with the international women's rights movement, to call for a radical shift in the power relations and resources within the humanitarian system. Women-led localisation ensures that women's leadership and agency is at the centre of humanitarian work. It refers to the multifaceted leadership roles that diverse groups of women and women-led organisations play in preparedness, response and recovery settings, which are often under-resourced and overlooked.*
>
> *[...]*
>
> *Strengthening international and national investment in local women-led organisations and their opportunities for collaboration, advances the presence and recognition of women-led organisations in the humanitarian system. This will contribute to addressing women and girl's specific needs, as well as advance gender equality and women's rights and make responses more effective for the whole community. This is because women bring a strong understanding of the local context and the needs and realities of women, girls and the community, and are often able to gain access to hard-to-reach communities and those who are most marginalised. Their contribution is vital not only in response, but in preparedness mechanisms, consultations, decision-making processes and coordination mechanisms on humanitarian action."*
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> (Yappika-ActionAid 2019b:12)

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16 Interview with some women organizations in Central Sulawesi and West Nusa Tenggara provinces, July 2020.
17 https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4314417/pengungsi-perempuan-anak-di-palu-rawan-alami-kekerasan-seksual. Accessed on 7 August 2020.
18 Interview with some women organizations in Central Sulawesi and West Nusa Tenggara, July 2020.

Yappika, ActionAid's Indonesian entity, worked with some women-led organisations in the Sulawesi response (Solidaritas Perempuan Palu, WALHI Central Sulawesi and Sikola Mombine) and conducted research (YAPPIKA-ActionAid 2019a; 2019b). Four key findings were:

- Existing gender inequalities have been exacerbated and disrupted following the Central Sulawesi disaster. This has created both risk and opportunity.

- Formal decision-making structures and coordination mechanisms for the Central Sulawesi response continue to be dominated by men. However, some local women's and women-led organisations have been able to assert influence in local decision-making spaces.

- Local women's and women-led organisations have diverse skills, knowledge and networks that are an enormous asset in humanitarian preparedness, response and recovery work. Yet, a lack of 'humanitarian expertise' and operational capacity challenges limit their full engagement.

- The central government has championed localisation in the Central Sulawesi response. There is also a 'supportive policy environment' for the advancement of women's rights and protection. However, there is a lack of connection between the two, as well as limited operationalisation at a local level (Yappika-ActionAid 2019b).

Indications of a missed opportunity to more strongly recognise and involve women as key actors and leaders in the response also come from other sources, as the following quote indicates.

> *"There was an international organization focusing only on logistic issue. It just developed temporary shelters, without any consideration on gender responsiveness. We checked the temporary shelters. Those were built in the village fields, without any electricity, and quite far access on bathroom. Those provide potentials for gender-based violence happening in the shelters"*
>
> **(a representative of women organisation in West Nusa Tenggara)**

From its research on the Sulawesi response, Yappika-ActionAid draws the following recommendations:

- Humanitarian agencies and donors need to understand the gendered norms and unequal power relations which shape women's lives prior to, during and after a humanitarian crisis and reflect this operationally, from incorporating feminist analysis in needs assessments to recognising the burden of unpaid and paid care work on women's participation and leadership in humanitarian action.

- Humanitarian agencies and donors should prioritise women's voices, perspectives and skills within humanitarian architecture and decision-making spaces as well as in their own organisations, ensuring the participation of local women's organisations in the cluster system and having progressive plans to achieve gender equality and equity in their humanitarian teams.

- Humanitarian agencies and donors should strengthen local partner capacity to respond to the unique scale, pace and demands of humanitarian response, but do so in a way that supports and connects with the sizes, aspiration and valuable skills and longer-term gender justice work of local women's organisations and their networks.

- Government disaster management actors should foster effective dialogue and collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organisations operating at both a national and local level, to support the implementation of gender equality and empowerment of women and girls in emergency policies and guidelines into practice (Yappika-ActionAid 2019b).

Caution, however, is required from international agencies about their pushing a gender transformation agenda. Regional workshops on Gender-Based Violence and Localisation (including for Asia where women from Indonesia participated) and the (unpublished) evaluation of a project on that issue (GMI 2019b), co-led by CARE and ActionAid in close collaboration with UNFPA as coordinator of the GBV Area of the Responsibility within the Global Protection Cluster, indicate that a fine balance has to be found between supporting gender equity and neglecting the social, economic and political concerns women share with men. Support for women's rights and women-led organisations should not push them into competition or confrontation with male-led ones. Nor should it be simply assumed that a male-led organisation cannot be working for gender equity and women's rights (Woodroffe & Aznar Herranz 2019).

Taking a broader perspective on inclusion, it has to be noted that there are only a few national and international organisations with a focus on and expertise in including disabled people in the design and implementation of emergency and recovery responses.[19] One disabled people's organisation was involved in the cluster coordination system for Central Sulawesi.[20] Their meaningful inclusion only took place where these were involved in the emergency response. In other cases, people with disabilities were mostly treated as passive receivers of assistance.

> *"Pelibatan perempuan dalam bingkai kesetaraan Gender dan mendorong peran aktif perempuan kebanyakan bersifat normatif sekedar memenuhi persyaratan proyek distribusi bantuan kemanusiaan ketimbang niat yang jujur untuk memberdayakan mereka."*
>
> *Translation: "The involvement of women within the framework of gender equality and promoting the active role of women have mostly been normative just to fulfil the requirements of humanitarian relief distribution projects rather than genuine intentions to empower them."*
>
> (Organisasi Masyarakat Sipil (2019) Position paper. Local civil society organizations on localization of aid in response to the earthquake in Central Sulawesi in 2018-2019. Palu: OMS)

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19 Interview with a disabled people's organization in Central Sulawesi, July 2020.
20 https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/mom_sub_klaster_klp_rentan_dan_disabilitas_19des18.pdf. Accessed on 7 August 2020.

ENABLING AND CONSTRAINING FACTORS FOR NATIONALLY-LED CRISIS MANAGEMENT

This research identifies, based on the interviews and discussions carried out, enabling and constraining factors from various stakeholders' points of view. The identified factors will be important for consideration when the Indonesian government and CSOs want to institutionalise localisation as expected by many CSOs.[21]

6.1 ENABLING FACTORS

On the CSO side, there are many national CSOs with the sustained capacities to conduct an effective emergency response. They are familiar with international standards and have long-standing, established collaborations and partnerships with international actors. Examples are YEU, SHEEP Foundation, MDMC, LPBINU and KARINA (Caritas Indonesia). Some national CSOs have networks of connected organisations, which can be national CSOs with local level structures such as LPBINU, MDMC and KARINA, or with longer-standing connections with many local CSOs, including issues other than emergency response. Several of these CSOs can mobilise human and financial resources across the Indonesian national territory and will respond to multiple disasters every year.[22] Collective platforms or consortia of national CSOs, such as ERCB and JMK bring added, complementary and coordinated capacity.

At community level, there is a strong mutual assistance culture (gotong royong), leading to a large number of people from all over Indonesia, many with professional qualifications, volunteering to assist. While volunteers are an additional resource, if they are not equipped with certain core skills or can only come for a short time, they may also be perceived as a burden. In both the West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi responses, there were many volunteers coming to the areas for providing assistance to disaster affected communities. Some local governments also facilitated sending volunteers to the areas.

From the international actor side, strong commitments of several INGOs to reinforce and support national and local capacities are identified. Examples are CBM and ASB, particularly supporting disabled people's organisations. Oxfam's longer-term reinforcement of the JMK network, and Cordaid's similar support for the ERCB are other examples. CARE is also working with local partners to build a network for stronger response capacity (Palmer et al. 2020). Prior agreements between international and national/local actors allow them to immediately focus on the response without the time-consuming delays of exploring, deciding and formalising collaborative agreements. Note that Oxfam and Cordaid here have such framework agreements with a platform or consortium of Indonesian CSOs rather than with individual ones. Administratively, this is even more efficient.[23]

With respect to government policy, an environment exists which is favourable to Indonesian-led action that, as much as possible, relies on Indonesian actors and capacities. Indonesia has developed emergency response mechanisms from local to national government level so that all emergencies will be led by the government agency corresponding to the level of the emergency status. In addition, the government has also executed a policy on managing

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21 The result of interviews and discussions with various stakeholders, July-August 2020.
22 Interview with various local and national CSOs in Indonesia, including MDMC, LPBINU, and KARINA, July-August 2020.
23 Interviews with Oxfam and Cordaid representative, July 2020.

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international agencies' roles during an emergency response. Financially, after the tsunami in Aceh 2004 and the earthquake in Yogyakarta 2006, there is now significantly more funding available from various Indonesian sources, such as private donors, philanthropists, private sector contributions. Most of this funding is flexible. For various smaller and medium-scale emergencies, Indonesian CSOs may largely or exclusively rely on locally and nationally raised funding.

6.2   CONSTRAINING FACTORS

On the CSOs side, many of them still do not have sufficient capacities to implement locally led emergency response. This is especially true for those who are not working on disaster management issues. There is room for further organisational development of local and some national CSOs. One area of attention, certainly for local CSOs, is further strengthening of administrative and financial practices. The lack of adequate procedures poses an obstacle for several of them to the receipt of direct funding (HAG & Pujiono Centre 2019a). Some CSOs also need further support in certain technical areas of emergency response.

As confirmed also in the Interagency Roundtable on localisation of aid (15 August 2020), further support is recommended for general organisational development of several CSOs, to put them in a position where they can handle several interventions, in 'project' format, simultaneously, and adequately report on them. For example, some local CSOs in the Sulawesi response worked with three or four international/national organisations, each of which has its own formats and reporting requirements. They cannot easily handle this without harmonisation or focused support on this.

On the government side, local governments are expected to lead the emergency response. However, there is insufficient experience and sometimes capacity in local government institutions to be also a major actor in the actual response, resulting in CSOs providing most of the emergency assistance, and to coordinate as effectively as required. In West Nusa Tenggara and Sulawesi responses for instance, many local CSOs did not coordinate intensively with local governments, since the room for coordination was limited.

In the cluster coordination, there was insufficient involvement of local CSOs. In some cluster meetings in the Central Sulawesi response, only 1 or 2 local CSOs actively participated.[24] Several coordination meeting rooms were also not accessible for people with disabilities (e.g. on the second floor of a government office building without lift for people with wheelchairs), de facto preventing participation of people with disabilities.[25] Those present also felt there was insufficient attention to involve affected communities and the local CSOs closely connecting with them, in the decision-making.[26] As a result, they organised their own Whatsapp group for rapid exchange of information and coordination among each other.

As far as donor requirements are concerned, there was too much 'distance' to the formal administrative, financial and reporting requirements of international actors. Local CSOs without much prior exposure to this can learn and develop the necessary skills, but it needs some time, while attention and energies are absorbed by an actual emergency response and within the time frame of a short-term project intervention.

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24 Interviews with some local CSOs in Central Sulawesi and West Nusa Tenggara, July 2020
25 Interview with a disabled people's organization in Central Sulawesi, July 2020
26 Organisasi Masyarakat Sipil (2019) Position paper. Local civil society organizations on localization of aid in response to the earthquake in Central Sulawesi in 2018-2019. Palu: OMS

> *"In cluster meeting, it was not about how to solve problems, but more about international organisations showing off their works, such as having built 30 houses. While local CSOs were only able to distribute clean water, so that we were discouraged."*
>
> **(a representative of a local NGO in Central Sulawesi)**

The absence of capacity support budgets and human resources among some international donors and programme agencies, during crisis times, both for the emergency response and the recovery, limits the opportunity for CSOs to improve their capacity. Several international donors and programme agencies only budgeted for direct project activities. The very limited capacity support focused only on some skills related to the specific project assignment.[27] As stated by local CSOs in Central Sulawesi, insufficient capacities of the CSOs leads to them being excluded from direct partnership with international actors, since the actors applied many requirements that can only be fulfilled by well-established CSOs.[28]

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27 Organisasi Masyarakat Sipil (2019) Position paper. Local civil society organizations on localization of aid in response to the earthquake in Central Sulawesi in 2018-2019. Palu: OMS
28 Interview with local CSOs in Central Sulawwesi, July 2020

7 GOOD PRACTICES

7.1 SUSTAINED SUPPORT AND PARTNERSHIP WITH PLATFORMS/CONSORTIA OF VARIOUS CSOs

This research has particularly highlighted, as illustrative examples, the cases of Oxfam and the JMK network, CORDAID and the ERCB consortium, and ASB.

> *"Sometimes, donors do not provide fund for capacity building. They tend to see tangible outputs. On emergency response phase, capacity building is not considered as important thing, as it is not lifesaving. For instance, DRR training is not lifesaving, compared to building latrines."*
>
> **(a national organisation representative)**

The collaborative relationship between Oxfam and the JMK network is now some 10 years old. The division of roles and responsibilities, and the issue of 'who leads' was dependent on how a disaster was classified. In a Category 2, as the West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi disasters were classified, Oxfam historically would lead their collective response. For the West Nusa Tenggara crisis (July-September 2018), Oxfam indeed maintained the leadership role, as it did for the initial phase of the Central Sulawesi one (September 2018 onwards). However, for the recovery in Central Sulawesi, the JMK network took over the leadership, with Oxfam providing some very targeted support on quality control and for reporting. The JMK network can now be expected to lead more and more often, as they already did also for the response to the floods in Luwu Utara, South Sulawesi. To be noted is that the 'capacity support' was not limited to technical competencies, but involved broader organisational development, including collaborative capacities as a joint platform or consortium.

Several years ago already, CORDAID scaled down in Indonesia, after assisting its partners to establish the ERCB consortium. ERCB then developed joint protocols and tested those in various response situations, such as the Sinabung Mount eruption in 2015. The ERCB network designed and led its own collective response to the Central Sulawesi crisis, working with local CSOs there as it had no prior presence, and also maintained the leadership around new or adapted actions during the COVID-19 outbreak. CORDAID too provides strongly targeted support, for example with monitoring and reporting to donors. 2020 may be the last year of substantial CORDAID support, so the ERCB is developing strategies for its future sustainability.[29]

Another example, already referred to, is the longer-term collaboration between ASB and several disabled people's organisations (DPO). Preparedness and competencies for emergency response is only one component of that collaboration. It led to ASB and its partners jointly doing assessments in the West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi disasters. In Central Sulawesi, several DPO came together in a 'disability working group' which designed and implemented its own interventions. ASB continued to provide almost on-the-job ongoing training and technical support. DPO staff members have become facilitators in various communities for the planning and implementation of various technical actions, e.g. around health and WASH, and wider disaster mitigation and preparedness. The disability working group is well acknowledged by the local authorities, and its input was requested at the start of the recovery activities, especially on shelter/housing reconstruction.[30]

In all instances, there has been consistent capacity strengthening and sharing between crises.

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29 Interviews with Oxfam, Cordaid representative, JMK member, and ERCB partner.
30 Interview with ASB and the disability working group member in Central Sulawesi, July 2020

The regularity of disasters in Indonesia also means that new learning can often fairly quickly be applied and tested in practice.

7.2   PARTNERSHIPS WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

An effective partnership was established, for the West Nusa Tenggara response, between the Provincial 'Women Empowerment and Child Protection Office', and UNFPA and LPSDM (a local women's organisation). While the provincial authorities were coordinating the overall response, it identified weaknesses in the quality of gender-responsiveness. The Provincial Office therefore requested support from UNFPA, which worked with LPSDM. This resulted in stronger and systematic promotion of gender-responsive assistance.[31]

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31 Interview with LPSDM, July 2020.

8 CONCLUSIONS

The research shows that the collective, governmental, and non-governmental capacities in Indonesia to manage smaller but also larger natural disasters are much stronger today than they were in 2004 or even 10 years ago. As in other Asia-Pacific countries vulnerable to various types of natural disaster – and impacts of man-made global warming- the Sendai Framework is a core policy reference. What is not clear is how strong the relevant capacities are for dealing with conflict-related humanitarian crises, and refugees.

The Indonesian government today has a clear policy, and regulations, especially expressed in the last West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi responses, to maintain national leadership and hence protect the space and roles of national and local actors in overall disaster management and emergency response. The emergency management system has been established, and it is mainly led by the government and military agencies. The research also shows that local CSOs in both areas were not sufficiently involved in the government-led responses. Emergency coordination was still dominated by government agencies and national and international organisations.

The research shows how the main drive to 'national capacities and national leadership' clearly comes from the government, predates the World Humanitarian Summit, and is therefore not explicitly related to the Grand Bargain. It also has to be understood and engaged within the context of the decentralisation process. The research indicates there may be capacity-limitations among local (provincial and district) authorities, and among local CSOs with variations across Indonesia. Those of local authorities appear to be caused by some structural factors in the overall public service functioning. These can best be addressed by the government itself, with assistance from bilateral and multilateral development partners, although some national Indonesian CSOs, with country-wide reach, can contribute too. At least for the two disaster cases that this research paid most attention to, in West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi, stronger and prior capacity support to local CSOs has been identified as an attention point, as well as a stronger connection between local CSOs and local authorities, for more effective, complementary collaboration.

On localisation issues, Indonesian CSOs have various perspectives on localisation of emergency response, but they agree that localisation is a means to achieve the goal of meeting the disaster affected communities' needs effectively. The cases of West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi responses have shown various types of localisation practices, and also good practices of localisation implemented by collaboration of local CSOs and INGOs. However, those are still initiatives from the network between particular INGOs and local CSOs. Localisation has not been commonly understood in the same way and applied by many actors, including governments.

Localisation was perceived and implemented somewhat differently in the investigated emergency cases in West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi. But many national CSOs and INGOs already working in Indonesia share the goal of meeting the disaster-affected communities' needs effectively. For this reason, in the discussion with various organisations, participants agreed that localisation should include community participation in decision-making, should be implemented by local actors (government and non-government) and should be coordinated by local government. It can be further supported by national and international organisations and requires policy and coordination from BNPB (national agency for disaster management). In other words, a response that is led and largely managed by administratively

and geographically 'local' actors is the goal. To achieve that, there is a way to go as currently most capacities and resources are concentrated at central national and international level.

Strengthening collaborative networks of CSOs with potential or actual national reach turns out to have been a worthwhile approach that is now showing significant returns on investment. National CSO networks start leading, including on key decisions related to design and implementation of responses, with international actors in a continuing supporting and reinforcing role, but around some very focused issues, like monitoring and reporting and dealing with certain other, complex (and non-harmonised) donor requirements.

9 MOVING FORWARD

The research identified the following ideas and suggestions for strategic contributions. These were tested and validated in a multi-actor meeting on 11 August 2020, that included a UN agency, INGOs and national and local CSOs.

- Developing a clear vision and framework to implement localisation in Indonesia. Since many humanitarian actors have various understandings of and implement localisation differently, a common understanding and vision of 'what success looks like' is required. The government would first have to state clearly what its view is on that and can refer to the purpose and spirit of the 2016 Grand Bargain reform agenda. The localisation commitment fits well with and can be integrated into the emergency management system developed at national and local level. The government can then facilitate humanitarian actors on developing a clear vision and framework to implement the localisation.

- The momentum of the revision of National Law No. 24/2007 and national mid-term development plan targets (2020-2024) that concern the implementation of the emergency management plan, can be used to include a localisation mandate. In addition, the roles of international assistance in emergency response are not sufficiently described in Government Regulation No. 23/2008. It needs a more technical regulation that can be used by local government for coordinating emergency response. This regulation can complement the Head of BNPB Regulation No. 3/2016 that is widely used as a main reference by many local governments.

- Strengthening coordination and collaboration at local and national level. Local CSOs should be included in the emergency response command system as described in the Head of BNPB Regulation No. 11/2014, so that they will have the legitimacy to actively participate in the response. This role should be mentioned clearly in the local emergency management plan or contingency plan. The networking between local, national, and international organisations should also be improved to enable faster responses. In addition, the presence and meaningful participation of national organisations in the Humanitarian Country Team and cluster coordination has to be increased. International agencies should step back a bit and allow and support national organisations to take more leadership roles.

- Local leadership on emergency response. Capacity building for both local government and CSOs, including village government is needed for stronger local leadership. The capacity should cover technical aspects of emergency response, organisational development, working standards, and reporting. In addition, since there are many volunteers coming to emergency locations, they have to be well managed in order to perform effectively. Furthermore, in order to equip local government senior officers for emergency response, this should be included as one of the subjects in the government leadership training.

- A concept of localisation that includes that of Grand Bargain commitment no. 6 to a 'participation revolution' means that affected populations have to be more than fairly passive recipients of aid, at best only able to provide 'feedback' on actions that have already been designed for them but without them. For this purpose, all actors have to massively educate communities on their rights during emergencies, and how those will be satisfied. Education at community level is needed as a basis for them to be able to participate significantly in emergency response, and dealing, negotiating, or working with actors providing assistances.

- National funding sources should be more elaborated and strengthened. At present, there are many national operational and philanthropic organisations that raise funds for emer-

gency response, including some mass media companies. However, the implementation of the funds collected does not provide real access for local CSOs. It would be better if the national government facilitates a public pooled fund for emergency response that is accessible for local CSOs. In addition, Presidential regulation No. 16/2018 provides opportunity for local government to cooperate with local CSOs on using the government budget.

- Many local CSOs expect that localisation is not only implemented in emergency response, but also on disaster recovery and pre-disaster activity (mitigation and preparedness). In many cases, like in West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi, many international agencies left the location when the emergency phase was ended by the government, while significant challenges remained for recovery. In this phase, mostly government offices were implementing the recovery, and they take quite a long time to implement due to some limitations, mainly financing procedures.

- Stronger integration is required for gender responsive programming and disability and other social inclusion into emergency responses. So far only a few organisations have shown good practice capabilities in this regard. This should become part of the overall practice. In every emergency management plan, gender and social inclusion have to be clearly set up in the indicators and implementation plans.

- Specifically, for international organisations or donors, local and national CSOs propose to use both qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure the success of emergency response programmes, to have time flexibility on implementing the programme, not only on emergency response, but also up to the recovery phase, and to allocate funds for capacity building activities. These proposals will create more space for local CSOs to implement programs that are relevant to communities' needs, to ensure community participation, and to meet international standards on humanitarian response.

In order to advance more quickly the implementation of localisation in many emergency responses in Indonesia, all actors should have frameworks for particular issues. Based on the discussion, participants agree to have frameworks as a guidance on four main issues, namely (i) integration of localisation within the government system, (ii) capacity building for local actors (CSOs and governments), (iii) adopting global standards on humanitarian response, and (iv) advocacy to donor agencies. The frameworks are needed, but there is still no clear decision on who will lead to facilitate the framework development. Some actors are identified, such as BNPB, Humanitarian Forum Indonesia, and UNOCHA, but this needs to be discussed further. Moreover, there are already initiatives from some international NGOs to conduct studies, action research or localisation relevant programmes/projects, like Oxfam, CBM, the consortium of ToGETHER (Caritas Germany, Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe, Malteser International and Welthungerhilfe) among them. It is not clear so far how these various initiatives can complement each other, and if and how they can contribute to develop these frameworks.[32]

Specific recommendations for each actor working on the localisation implementation in Indonesia are as follows:

1. Local CSOs:

    (i) establish a local network or forum such as the DRR Forum,

    (ii) build networks with national CSOs and international organisations,

    (iii) develop a coordination mechanism with local government, mainly BPBD (local

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32 This information is the result of online discussion with 22 organizations on 11 August 2020.

disaster management agency), and

(iv) promote and manage local volunteers, including strengthening their technical capacities on emergency response.

2. Local governments:

(i) develop a local emergency management system and plan that accommodate local CSOs' role in emergency response,

(ii) establish a coordination mechanism or forum with various actors, including local CSOs, universities, volunteer organisation, and private sector,

(iii) facilitate disaster preparedness and drills with local CSOs, volunteers, and communities, and

(iv) allocate budget for emergency response annually as stated in the Ministry of Home Affairs 2019 Regulation number 90.

3. National CSOs:

(i) strengthen networks or consortia with local CSOs on an equitable basis

(ii) provide technical assistance and capacity building to local CSOs in a supporting and reinforcing manner

(iii) take more responsibility and a role in the Humanitarian Country Team and cluster coordination while ensuring full inclusion of local CSOs

(iv) advocate to national government on providing policies to implement localisation, and

(v) advocate to international agencies and donors to be more flexible in terms of timeframe, indicators to achieve, and capacity building on emergency response.

4. National government:

(i) provide policies to implement localisation effectively on emergency response and recovery,

(ii) facilitate the collaboration between national CSOs and international organisations,

(iii) train the local government senior officers on emergency response systems and localisation,

(iv) facilitate the development of a local emergency management system and plan, and

(v) facilitate a disaster management pooled fund that can be accessed by national and local CSOs.

5. International NGOs and donors:

(i) provide technical but also organisational capacity development support and budget for national and local CSOs, while also learning from them in a process of 'capacity-sharing'

(ii) ensure international standards on emergency response, including standards on reporting are not only disseminated but also understood,

(iii) support, upon demand, national CSOs to develop frameworks on localisation implementation,

(iv) have a commitment to work not only on emergency response but also on the recovery phase through partnerships with national and local CSOs, and

(v) support national government on developing the local system for emergency management.

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